Grounding principles for inferring agency: Two cultural perspectives

Abstract

The present research investigates cultural variation in grounding principles for inferring agency in order to address an important theoretical debate: does cultural diversity in agency concepts reflect an animistic overextension of (universal) folkpsychology, as many have argued, or an alternative theory of folkcommunication based on relational principles? In two experiments, mind perception measures were adapted to assess beliefs concerning the agency of non-animal kinds (plants, abiotic kinds, complex artifacts) among Indigenous Ngöbe adults in Panama and US college students. Agency attributions varied systematically, with Ngöbe ascribing greater agency to non-animal natural kinds and US college participants ascribing greater agency to complex artifacts. Analysis of explanations revealed divergent interpretations of agency as a prototypically human capacity requiring consciousness (US), versus a relational capacity expressed in directed interactions (Ngöbe). Converging measures further illuminated the inferential principles underlying these agency attributions. (1) An experimental relational framing of agency probes facilitated Ngöbe but not US agency attributions. (2) Further analysis showed that three key dimensions of agency attribution (experience, cognition, animacy) are organized differently across cultures. (3) A Bayesian approach to cultural consensus modeling confirmed the presence of two distinct consensus models rather than variations on a single (universal) model. Together, these results indicate that conceptual frameworks for agency differ across US college and Ngöbe communities. We conclude that Ngöbe concepts of agency derive from a distinct theory of folkcommunication based on an ecocentric prototype rather than overextensions of an anthropocentric folkpsychology. These observations suggest that folkpsychology and mind perception represent culture specific frameworks for agency, with significant implications for domain-specificity theory and our understanding of cognitive diversity.

Cognition Beyond the Human: Cognitive Psychology and the New Animism

“…Our initial analyses took a broad look by collapsing across the specific capacities (thought, desire, etc.) for an overall measure of “agency.” As predicted, results from several experiments have shown that Ngöbe are more likely than US participants to attribute agency to plants and abiotic kinds based on their capacity to interact with the environment, as compared to US participants who are relatively more likely to attribute agency to complex artifacts due to their human‐designed information processing capacities (Ojalehto, Medin, and Garcia 2017a; Ojalehto, Medin, and Garcia 2017b) (see Figure 1). 3 Looking within the Ngöbe results more closely, we see that plants are ascribed agency at levels closer to that of animals than artifacts, suggesting that agency is seen as a shared property of vegetal and animal kinds.…”

“…We hypothesized that Ngöbe would attribute agency based on a folktheory of communication where the constructs revolve around relationships, interactions, and signs, whereas US participants would rely on a mentalistic folkpsychology that revolves around minds, mental states, and interior consciousness. To assess this, we developed a coding scheme to analyze participants’ verbal explanations for constructs associated with each hypothesized cultural folktheory (details in Ojalehto, Medin, and Garcia 2017b, 2015a).…”

The Minds of God(s) and Humans: Differences in Mind Perception in Fiji and North America

“…The splitting of human agency into agency‐other and agency‐self, as show in the Fijian samples, may reflect a relational understanding of mind—that mind exists in the space between people rather than just within an individual (see ojalehto et al., ). This emphasis on a relational, sociocentric model of self is important throughout the Pacific (Airni, Anae, & Mila‐Schaaf, ; Anae, ; Brison, ; Poltorak, ) and may be filtering into the processes of how people conceive of minds that we measure here.…”

“…There are some existing psychological studies that show that both culture and religious beliefs can affect how individuals reason about minds. Work with the Ngöbe people of Panama has found that the Ngöbe use ecological and social relationships, rather than animacy and consciousness, as a basis for agency (ojalehto et al., ,b). This is illustrated by the finding that the Ngöbe include plants and abiotic entities in their category of things that have agency and a capacity for intentional actions along with animals or humans.…”

“…These abilities, and the ability to socially learn and transmit knowledge that comes with them, are part of the foundation of our remarkable ability to create the myriad of different cultures we live in (Chudek & Henrich, ; Chudek, Zhao, & Henrich, ; Henrich, ). These cultural differences can, in turn, affect how we conceive of and reason about minds (e.g., ojalehto, Medin, & García, ,b). Some of the most striking examples of how culture can influence mind concepts are in how we understand the minds of gods and spirits (Astuti & Harris, ; D'Andrade, ; Knight, ; Knight, Sousa, Barrett, & Atran, ; Lane, Wellman, & Evans, ).…”