Grounding Nominalism

Abstract

The notion of grounding has gained increasing acceptance among metaphysicians in recent years. In this paper, I argue that this notion can be used to formulate a very attractive version of (property) nominalism, a view that I call ‘grounding nominalism’. Simplifying somewhat, this is the view that all properties are grounded in things. I argue that this view is coherent and has a decisive advantage over competing versions of nominalism: it allows us to accept properties as real, while fully accommodating nominalist intuitions. Finally, I defend grounding nominalism against several seemingly troublesome objections.

La teoría cognitiva de las proposiciones y metafísica de propiedades

“…Así, si a es F y b es F, existe una propiedad numéricamente la misma que está 'presente' tanto en el objeto a como en el objeto b. Objetos que poseen la 'misma' naturaleza son, desde esta perspectiva, objetos que instancian el mismo universal. Otra corriente ha rechazado de plano la existencia de propiedades como entidades numéricamente diferentes de los objetos de los que se predican (Rodríguez-Pereyra, 2002;Imaguire, 2018;Schulte, 2019). Lo que suponemos que es la 'misma' propiedad en diferentes objetos no es una 'cosa' diferente de tales objetos.…”

“…En lo que sigue no será necesario considerar todas estas y otras cualificaciones. nominalismo 'de prioridad' o 'de fundación' (Imaguire, 2018;Schulte, 2019) que serán tratadas más abajo a propósito del perfil de prioridad de las propiedades respecto de sus instanciaciones.…”

“…vez llamadas peyorativamente como "nominalismo de avestruz" 16 . Estas formas de nominalismo han recibido mayor atención últimamente (Imaguire, 2018;Schulte, 2019). La idea central de estas concepciones es que todas las teorías que han sido propuestas en metafísica de propiedades deben introducir en un punto u otro hecho primitivos, no explicables por otros, para resolver el famoso regreso de Bradley.…”

Properties

“…At most, the grounding theorist can hypothesize that reality's structure either does or doesn't include properties on the fundamental level (for a reason to think that it doesn't, cf. Schulte 2019). This is because to "go grounding theoretical" only allows you to "deploy diagnostics for what is fundamental, together with diagnostics for grounding" (351).…”

Deflationary Theories of Properties and Their Ontology

“…Indeed, the metaphor that properties are shadows of predicates could sensibly be cashed out as a thesis of ontological or metaphysical priority, according to which facts about property existence and possession are grounded in facts about primitive predication. For instance, Horwich [1998a: 25] suggests that the fact that a has the property of being F is 'constituted by' the fact that a is F. This would bring deflationism into the vicinity of some recent versions of Ostrich nominalism-namely, Grounding nominalism -that are based on such grounding claims [Imaguire 2018;Dixon 2018;Schulte 2019]. 5 Third, deflationists might adopt some fictionalist view of property talk.…”