Ground Water Basin Management

Krieger, James H.; Banks, Harvey O.

doi:10.2307/3478882

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Unsurprisingly, these “adjudications” are rare—they cover only 22 of California's 431 basins [ California Department of Water Resources , 2003; “Court Adjudications,” 2009, available from http://www.water.ca.gov/]. Without basin adjudications, the system probably encourages overpumping [ Krieger and Banks , 1962; Sandino , 2005]. This system also relies on an adversarial, rather than potentially more constructive, creative, collaborative process [ Sheer , 2010].…”

Section: The Legal and Institutional Context Of Controlling Groundwatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing local planning to control groundwater depletion: California as a microcosm of global issues

Nelson¹

2012

Water Resources Research

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Groundwater pumping has caused excessive groundwater depletion around the world, yet regulating pumping remains a profound challenge. California uses more groundwater than any other U.S. state, and serves as a microcosm of the adverse effects of pumping felt worldwide—land subsidence, impaired water quality, and damaged ecosystems, all against the looming threat of climate change. The state largely entrusts the control of depletion to the local level. This study uses internationally accepted water resources planning theories systematically to investigate three key aspects of controlling groundwater depletion in California, with an emphasis on local‐level action: (a) making decisions and engaging stakeholders; (b) monitoring groundwater; and (c) using mandatory, fee‐based and voluntary approaches to control groundwater depletion (e.g., pumping restrictions, pumping fees, and education about water conservation, respectively). The methodology used is the social science‐derived technique of content analysis, which involves using a coding scheme to record these three elements in local rules and plans, and State legislation, then analyzing patterns and trends. The study finds that Californian local groundwater managers rarely use, or plan to use, mandatory and fee‐based measures to control groundwater depletion. Most use only voluntary approaches or infrastructure to attempt to reduce depletion, regardless of whether they have more severe groundwater problems, or problems which are more likely to have irreversible adverse effects. The study suggests legal reforms to the local groundwater planning system, drawing upon its empirical findings. Considering the content of these recommendations may also benefit other jurisdictions that use a local groundwater management planning paradigm.

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Section: The Legal and Institutional Context Of Controlling Groundwatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing local planning to control groundwater depletion: California as a microcosm of global issues

Nelson¹

2012

Water Resources Research

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“…The taker's beneficial use becomes even more incidental. In 1949 the California Supreme Court triggered a "race to the pump house" (Krieger and Banks, 1962) when it proclaimed the doctrine of "mutual prescription" for groundwater basins (City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 1949). This "encouraged defensive ground water overdrafting by pumpers in other basins who anticipated ground water adjudication" (Gleason, 1977).…”

Section: Ijse 364mentioning

confidence: 99%

The hidden taxable capacity of land: enough and to spare

Gaffney

2009

International Journal of Social Economics

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Purpose -A tax based on land value is in many ways ideal, but many economists dismiss it by assuming it could not raise enough revenue. Standard sources of data omit much of the potential tax base, and undervalue what they do measure. The purpose of this paper is to present more comprehensive and accurate measures of land rents and values, and several modes of raising revenues from them besides the conventional property tax. Design/methodology/approach -The paper identifies 16 elements of land's taxable capacity that received authorities either trivialize or omit. These 16 elements come in four groups. Findings -In Group A, Elements 1-4 correct for the downward bias in standard sources. In Group B, Elements 5-10 broaden the concepts of land and rent beyond the conventional narrow perception, while Elements 11-12 estimate rents to be gained by abating other kinds of taxes. In Group C, Elements 13-14 explain how using the land tax, since it has no excess burden, uncaps feasible tax rates. In Group D, Elements 15-16 define some moot possibilities that may warrant further exploration. Originality/value -This paper shows how previous estimates of rent and land values have been narrowly limited to a fraction of the whole, thus giving a false impression that the tax capacity is low. The paper adds 14 elements to the traditional narrow "single tax" base, plus two moot elements advanced for future consideration. Any one of these 16 elements indicates a much higher land tax base than economists commonly recognize today. Taken together they are overwhelming, and cast an entirely new light on this subject.

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“…The taker's beneficial use becomes even more incidental. In 1949 the California Supreme Court triggensd a "race to the pump house" (Krieger and Banks, 1962) when it proclaimed the doctrine of "mutual prescription" for groundwater basins (City of Pasadena v. City ofAlhambra, 1949). This "encouraged defensive ground water overdrafting by pumpers in other basins who anticipated ground water adjudication" (Gleason,709).…”

Section: Vii2 Rent-seeking Perverts the Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

what Price Water Marketing?

Gaffney¹

1997

American J Econ Sociol

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We can multiply the value of output from limited natural water supplies by allocating them to higher uses. To this end we need a market in raw water, but existing markets work badly, for several reasons. Sellers are undermotivated, absent taxes or debt. Free groundwater subverts the pricing of surface water. Loss of elevation, and damage from effluents, and instream uses are not charged for. Obsolete subsidies abound; obsolete entitlements dominate allocation. Some trades extinguish public rights. Rent-seeking distorts allocation. Needed public agencies have been subverted by organized land speculators. Recommendations are given.

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Ground Water Basin Management

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Assessing local planning to control groundwater depletion: California as a microcosm of global issues

Assessing local planning to control groundwater depletion: California as a microcosm of global issues

The hidden taxable capacity of land: enough and to spare

what Price Water Marketing?

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