With the development of cloud computing, many organizations are deploying their IT infrastructures through cloud platforms so as to provide services for more and more users. Therefore, resource pricing mechanism becomes a key component in these open cloud platforms. In this paper, we propose a gaming theory based cloud resource pricing model, in which a cooperative gaming model is applied to optimize the resource benefits and noncooperative gaming model is used to balance the user's costs and provider's benefits. Theoretical analysis is presented to validate the correctness of the proposed gaming model, and extensive experiments are conducted to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed resource pricing mechanism. The results indicate that our resource pricing mechanism outperforms many existing approaches in terms of resource profits and response time, especially when the cloud system is in presence of intensive workloads.pricing mechanism will lead to many negative effects on system performance with the increasing of system scale, such as low resource utilization [14-16], load unbalancing [12,17,18], undesirable QoS satisfaction [19,20]. To address the above issues, in this work we present a cloud resource pricing model with aiming at overcoming the shortcomings of existing price mechanisms in terms of efficiency and fairness. In our pricing model, virtual resource configuration and provision are defined as a two-phrase gaming procedure, in which cooperative gaming model is applied to optimize the resource benefits and non-cooperative gaming model is used to balance the user's costs and provider's benefits.The rest of this paper is organized as following: Section 2 presents the related work; In Section 3, the gaming models are presented with problem description; In Section 4 the solutions of game models are presented theoretically; In Section 5, experiments are conducted to examine the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with a brief discussion of the future work. (b) β= 1.5 (a) β= 2.0 (b) β= 2.5 Figure 2.