Green Investment and Coordination Failure: An Investors' Perspective

Mielke, Jahel; Steudle, Gesine A.

doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2018.03.018

Cited by 44 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Adding to this, the interviews also showed the importance of expectations, concerning for example reputation and credibility of policies. This corresponds to the game theoretic reasoning described in Mielke and Steudle (2018) and to the extended model of Wüstenhagen and Menichetti (2012) which includes expectations, bounded rationality and path dependencies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The model assumes that players choose their equilibrium strategies by evaluating expected payoffs, which are determined by payoffs and expectations concerning the behavior of the other players. Based on this reasoning, policy, market and civil society signals as described in this paper could serve as coordination mechanisms in investors' decision making for green and brown technologies, possibly leading to a tipping point for green investment (Mielke and Steudle 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The framework developed in this paper to investigate policy, market and civil society signals that influence investment decisions is thus based on game theoretic reasoning. It relates to a model by Mielke and Steudle (2018) which describes investors' decisions for Figure 1. Annual infrastructure investment gap in the EU until 2030 in €bn; Source: numbers assembled from Berndt et al (2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Signals for 2°C: the influence of policies, market factors and civil society actions on investment decisions for green infrastructure

Mielke

2018

Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment

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The targets of the Paris Agreement make it necessary to redirect finance flows towards sustainable, low-carbon infrastructures and technologies. Currently, the potential of institutional investors to help finance this transition is widely discussed. Thus, this paper takes a closer look at influence factors for green investment decisions of large European insurance companies. With a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, the importance of policy, market and civil society signals is evaluated. In summary, respondents favor measures that promote green investment, such as feed-in tariffs or adjustments of capital charges for green assets, over ones that make carbon-intensive investments less attractive, such as the phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies or a carbon price. While investors currently see a low impact of the carbon price, they rank a substantial reform as an important signal for the future. Respondents also emphasize that policy signals have to be coherent and credible to coordinate expectations.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Signals for 2°C: the influence of policies, market factors and civil society actions on investment decisions for green infrastructure

Mielke

2018

Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment

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“…probe into the recent trends in behavioral environmental economics. After repeated experiments, Mielke and Steudle, (2018) prove that the Pareto optimal state can be achieved through reliable climate policies or climate investment incentives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Behavioral Psychology Analysis of Individual Decision, Strategic Interaction and Climate Governance

2020

RACP

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Considering the limitations of standard economics in the research of climate governance, this paper employs the behavioral economics theory and behavioral psychology to explain the individual decision in the climate governance and the strategic interaction between countries. Firstly, realistic framework of behavioral economics was constructed, which covers psychological factors like quasi-hyperbolic discounting, value function, loss aversion, fairness, and reciprocity. The established framework was then compared with the standard economic model. The main results are as follows: on individual decision, the bounded rationality is limited by the inconsistency between loss aversion and time preference, adding to the difficulty of emission reduction; on strategic interaction, fairness is the key to international climate negotiation; the negotiating parties should set fair rules on emission reduction and restrain the excessive self-interested behaviors of developed countries; the prisoner's dilemma in international climate negotiation can be solved through cooperation and reciprocity between low self-interested parties; an effective communication mechanism is essential to the success of global climate governance.

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“…Individuals tend to participate in coordinated projects only if they know that others will too, and if they know that others know that others will do so, and so on-a situation referred to as "common knowledge" (Thomas, DeScioli, Haque, & Pinker, 2014). Such coordination problems occur in conservation when, for example, everyone would benefit from adopting a new green technology, but only if everyone else does too, because acting alone incurs a substantial cost (Kimmich & Sagebiel, 2016;Mielke & Steudle, 2018).…”

Section: Family Valuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative conservation: Seven ways to save the world

Curry

Hare

Hepburn

et al. 2019

Conservat Sci and Prac

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The world faces serious environmental problems. To solve them we must work together. Fortunately, humans are a very cooperative species. We have faced a range of cooperative problems in the past, and have evolved and invented a range of cooperative solutions to them—kin altruism, mutualism, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness, and property rights. Here, we illustrate how each of these solutions can be pressed into the service of conservation goals. Unlocking this potential will require overcoming conservationists' current cycloptic focus on only one type of cooperative problem (the prisoner's dilemma) and one type of solution (reciprocity). Only then will policy makers be able draw on the full range of cooperative dispositions and design more systematic and effective environmental interventions.

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Green Investment and Coordination Failure: An Investors' Perspective

Cited by 44 publications

References 46 publications

Signals for 2°C: the influence of policies, market factors and civil society actions on investment decisions for green infrastructure

Signals for 2°C: the influence of policies, market factors and civil society actions on investment decisions for green infrastructure

Behavioral Psychology Analysis of Individual Decision, Strategic Interaction and Climate Governance

Cooperative conservation: Seven ways to save the world

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