Greedy Distinguishers and Nonrandomness Detectors

Stankovski, Paul

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17401-8_16

Cited by 47 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…All the previously published single-key attacks ( [2], [5], [6], [7] and [8]) on Grain-128 which are substantially better than exhaustive search can only deal with simplified versions of the cryptosystem. In [9] a sliding property was used to speed-up exhaustive search by a factor of two.…”

Section: Previous Results On Grain-128mentioning

confidence: 99%

An Experimentally Verified Attack on Full Grain-128 Using Dedicated Reconfigurable Hardware

Dinur

Güneysu

Paar

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. In this paper we describe the first single-key attack which can recover the full key of the full version of Grain-128 for arbitrary keys by an algorithm which is significantly faster than exhaustive search (by a factor of about 2 38 ). It is based on a new version of a cube tester, which uses an improved choice of dynamic variables to eliminate the previously made assumption that ten particular key bits are zero. In addition, the new attack is much faster than the previous weak-key attack, and has a simpler key recovery process. Since it is extremely difficult to mathematically analyze the expected behavior of such attacks, we implemented it on RIVYERA, which is a new massively parallel reconfigurable hardware, and tested its main components for dozens of random keys. These tests experimentally verified the correctness and expected complexity of the attack, by finding a very significant bias in our new cube tester for about 7.5% of the keys we tested. This is the first time that the main components of a complex analytical attack are successfully realized against a full-size cipher with a special-purpose machine. Moreover, it is also the first attack that truly exploits the configurable nature of an FPGA-based cryptanalytical hardware.

show abstract

Section: Previous Results On Grain-128mentioning

confidence: 99%

An Experimentally Verified Attack on Full Grain-128 Using Dedicated Reconfigurable Hardware

Dinur

Güneysu

Paar

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Chosen IV Attacks. In [35] a distinguishing attack on the whole 256 round version of Grain 128 was presented. This indicates that the number of rounds during initialization and/or the nonlinearity of the functions used in Grain 128 are not high enough.…”

Section: Security Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Lightweight Stream Ciphers with Shorter Internal States

Armknecht

Mikhalev

2015

Fast Software Encryption

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. To be resistant against certain time-memory-data-tradeoff (TMDTO) attacks, a common rule of thumb says that the internal state size of a stream cipher should be at least twice the security parameter. As memory gates are usually the most area and power consuming components, this implies a sever limitation with respect to possible lightweight implementations. In this work, we revisit this rule. We argue that a simple shift in the established design paradigm, namely to involve the fixed secret key not only in the initialization process but in the keystream generation phase as well, enables stream ciphers with smaller area size for two reasons. First, it improves the resistance against the mentioned TMDTO attacks which allows to choose smaller state sizes. Second, one can make use of the fact that storing a fixed value (here: the key) requires less area size than realizing a register of the same length. We demonstrate the feasibility of this approach by describing and implementing a concrete stream cipher Sprout which uses significantly less area than comparable existing lightweight stream ciphers.

show abstract

“…For the sake of completeness we mention some distinguisher attacks based on cube testers in [27,6,35]. The best covers up to 961 rounds working in a reduced key space of 2 26 keys (out of 2 80 ).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advanced Algebraic Attack on Trivium

Quedenfeld

Wolf

2016

Mathematical Aspects of Computer and Information Sciences

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. This paper presents an algebraic attack against Trivium that breaks 625 rounds using only 4096 bits of output in an overall time complexity of 2 42.2 Trivium computations. While other attacks can do better in terms of rounds (799), this is a practical attack with a very low data usage (down from 2 40 output bits) and low computation time (down from 2 62 ). From another angle, our attack can be seen as a proof of concept: how far can algebraic attacks can be pushed when several known techniques are combined into one implementation? All attacks have been fully implemented and tested; our figures are therefore not the result of any potentially error-prone extrapolation, but results of practical experiments.

show abstract

Greedy Distinguishers and Nonrandomness Detectors

Cited by 47 publications

References 21 publications

An Experimentally Verified Attack on Full Grain-128 Using Dedicated Reconfigurable Hardware

An Experimentally Verified Attack on Full Grain-128 Using Dedicated Reconfigurable Hardware

On Lightweight Stream Ciphers with Shorter Internal States

Advanced Algebraic Attack on Trivium

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About