Great expectations—ethics, avian flu and the value of progress

Abstract

A recent controversy over the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity's recommendation to censor two publications on genetically modified H5N1 avian influenza has generated concern over the threat to scientific freedom such censorship presents. In this paper, I argue that in the case of these studies, appeals to scientific freedom are not sufficient to motivate a rejection of censorship. I then use this conclusion to draw broader concerns about the ethics of dual-use research.

Valuing Knowledge: a Reply to the Epistemological Perspective on the Value of Gain-of-Function Experiments

“…There is little doubt that there is epistemic value in GOF studies and other research posing a “dual-use dilemma.” In point of fact, the epistemic gains posed by dual-use research are a strong contributor to the “dilemma” that we face; it is uncontroversial that scientific knowledge has value ( 4 , 5 ). What is in question, however, is how we account for the significance of this value; how scientific knowledge relates to other important values; and how we weigh the value of epistemic gains against competing considerations, such as the risks posed by the accidental or intentional release of virulent pathogens.…”

“But Nature Started It”: Examining Taubenberger and Morens’ View on Influenza A Virus and Dual-Use Research of Concern

“…The “dual” in “dual use” explicitly identifies research that may be used to benefit or harm humanity (3–6). Yet the evolution of IAV, at least in the cases that Taubenberger and Morens raise, has no benefits to human or animal health (3).…”

“…Since the 2004 “Fink Report” on DURC (3), the power of nature to cause harm via evolutionary mechanisms creating a gain of function in IAV has been understood; it is understood that two of the legitimate aims of DURC are to understand emerging diseases, such as novel strains of IAV, and to attempt to mitigate the harms caused by such emergence (3, 4). What remains unanswered, here as elsewhere, is the question of how to properly realize the purported benefits of such research (6, 7). This is a challenge that any opponent of current regulations must address; simply advocating the dangers of IAV does little to combat regulations.…”

The ethics of biosafety considerations in gain-of-function research resulting in the creation of potential pandemic pathogens: Table 1

“…A few studies involving creation of novel, potentially transmissible influenza viruses were published with little fanfare in the years that followed [5,6]. The debate was rekindled [2,[7][8][9][10], however, by two publications in 2012 describing the creation of ferrettransmissible strains of influenza [11,12].…”