Graph-based Coalitional Games - An Analysis via Characteristics

Nebel, Frank

doi:10.4108/icst.valuetools.2011.245796

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Several subsequent papers [4,19] studied computability and complexity aspects of this game. Some properties of graphs and games guaranteeing the existence of a core have been proposed and the computability complexity of computing cores have been established (NP-complete and #P-complete).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting service provider alliances

Cohen,

Cordeiro,

Echabbi

2019

Preprint

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We present an algorithm for detecting service provider alliances. To perform this, we modelize a cooperative game-theoretic model for competitor service providers. A choreography (a peer-to-peer service composition model) needs a set of services to fulfill its requirements. Users must choose, for each requirement, which service providers will be used to enact the choreography at lowest cost. Due to the lack of centralization, vendors can form alliances to control the market. We propose a novel algorithm capable of detecting alliances among service providers, based on our findings showing that this game has an empty core, but a non-empty bargaining set.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting service provider alliances

Cohen,

Cordeiro,

Echabbi

2019

Preprint

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“…For instance, Michalak et al (2013a) established that computing the Shapley value-based centrality measure for connectivity games on graphs is #Pcomplete. Various other cooperative games on graphs that could be used as centrality measures are also challenging (Bachrach & Rosenschein, 2009;Greco, Malizia, Palopoli, & Scarcello, 2011;Nebel, 2011;Aziz & de Keijzer, 2014).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient Computation of Semivalues for Game-Theoretic Network Centrality

Tarkowski¹,

Szczepański²,

Michalak³

et al. 2018

jair

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Some game-theoretic solution concepts such as the Shapley value and the Banzhaf index have recently gained popularity as measures of node centrality in networks. While this direction of research is promising, the computational problems that surround it are challenging and have largely been left open. To date there are only a few positive results in the literature, which show that some game-theoretic extensions of degree-, closeness- and betweenness-centrality measures are computable in polynomial time, i.e., without the need to enumerate the exponential number of all possible coalitions. In this article, we show that these results can be extended to a much larger class of centrality measures that are based on a family of solution concepts known as semivalues. The family of semivalues includes, among others, the Shapley value and the Banzhaf index. To this end, we present a generic framework for defining game-theoretic network centralities and prove that all centrality measures that can be expressed in this framework are computable in polynomial time. Using our framework, we present a number of new and polynomial-time computable game-theoretic centrality measures.

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“…Several subsequent papers [5,18] studied computability and complexity aspects of this game. Some properties of graphs and games guaranteeing the existence of a core have been proposed and the computability complexity of computing cores have been established (NP-complete and #P-complete).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting service provider alliances on the choreography enactment pricing game

Cohen,

Cordeiro,

Echabbi

2016

Preprint

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We present the choreography enactment pricing game, a cooperative game-theoretic model for the study of scheduling of jobs using competitor service providers. A choreography (a peer-to-peer service composition model) needs a set of services to fulfill its jobs requirements. Users must choose, for each requirement, which service providers will be used to enact the choreography at lowest cost. Due to the lack of centralization, vendors can form alliances to control the market. We show a novel algorithm capable of detecting alliances among service providers, based on our study of the bargaining set of this game.

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Graph-based Coalitional Games - An Analysis via Characteristics

Cited by 4 publications

References 19 publications

Detecting service provider alliances

Detecting service provider alliances

Efficient Computation of Semivalues for Game-Theoretic Network Centrality

Detecting service provider alliances on the choreography enactment pricing game

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