Grafting Trees: A Fault Attack Against the SPHINCS Framework

Castelnovi, Laurent; Martinelli, Ange; Prest, Thomas

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-79063-3_8

Cited by 25 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…In general, SPHINCS+ is probably the least likely of any post-quantum signature candidate to be broken cryptanalytically. On the other hand, the design of SPHINCS+ makes it especially vulnerable to fault attacks [51,52] and, to a lesser extent, side-channel attacks.…”

Section: Sphincs+mentioning

confidence: 99%

Status report on the second round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process

Moody¹,

Alagic²,

Apon³

et al. 2020

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Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

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Section: Sphincs+mentioning

confidence: 99%

Status report on the second round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process

Moody¹,

Alagic²,

Apon³

et al. 2020

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“…Fault injection attacks have been shown to be effective against hash-based signatures, though they are more severe when used against stateless schemes like SPHINCS and its variants [9] [10]. With hash-based signatures, the attack works by forcing the cryptographic device to sign two different messages with the same OTS key.…”

Section: Fault Injection Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…With hash-based signatures, the attack works by forcing the cryptographic device to sign two different messages with the same OTS key. The attack takes advantage of the schemes where multiple levels of Merkle trees are used and the roots of lower-level trees are signed using a onetime signature (XMSS MT and HSS) [10]. In some cases, the signatures on these roots are recomputed each time a message is signed.…”

Section: Fault Injection Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…When implementing multiple levels of trees as described in Section 7, this is the only option since no cryptographic module will use any OTS more than once. If multiple levels of trees are implemented within a single cryptographic module, it is recommended to cache a single, one-820 time signature per layer of subtrees, refreshing them when a new subtree is used for signing [10].…”

Section: Fault Injection Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

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Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes

Cooper¹

2019

Preprint

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This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130. Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.

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“…While the OTS key is used more than once, the message being signed is the same, so the result is to just recreate the same signature (as long as the randomizer value is the same each time). However, as noted in[9] and[10], such implementations are vulnerable to fault injection attacks. Implementations compliant with this publication must sign the root of each tree only once.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%