2016
DOI: 10.17016/feds.2016.092
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Gradualism and Liquidity Traps

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Absent an explicit commitment technology or reputational force, discretionary central bankers are unable to credibly render monetary policy after a liquidity trap contingent on the state of the economy during the trap. To what extent alternative delegation schemes can generate the type of history-dependence seen in optimal commitment policy is a subject of our ongoing research Nakata and Schmidt (2015).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Absent an explicit commitment technology or reputational force, discretionary central bankers are unable to credibly render monetary policy after a liquidity trap contingent on the state of the economy during the trap. To what extent alternative delegation schemes can generate the type of history-dependence seen in optimal commitment policy is a subject of our ongoing research Nakata and Schmidt (2015).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Billi (2013) revisits the desirability of assigning a nominal-income stabilization objective to the central bank. In our ongoing work, we compare the relative benefits of various alternative objectives, including interest-rate smoothing, price-level stabilization, and nominal-income stabilization (Nakata and Schmidt, 2015). This paper is also related to a set of papers that examine the desirability of Rogoff's conservative central banker in settings other than the original model with inflation bias.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, it achieves this by responding suboptimally to large positive shocks, which increases their pass-through to the economy. A similar, more nuanced approach is to reduce the overall response to shocks (see, e.g., Nakata and Schmidt (2016)). This works through the same mechanism as an upper bound on interest rates and increases expected inflation, but also at the cost of greater pass-through of shocks to the economy.…”
Section: Dovish Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this branch of the literature, monetary policy is described by some (generally suboptimal) Taylor-type rule. But the multiplicity of equilibria generated by the zero lower bound is not restricted to that case: as shown in Armenter (2018) and Nakata and Schmidt (2016), it also emerges under the assumption of a central bank optimizing under discretion. 8 Even if such multiplicity is clearly suboptimal, there is little that a central bank operating under discretion can do about it, because the zero lower bound limits its ability to stabilize inflation.…”
Section: Self-fulfilling Deflation Traps and The Zero Lower Boundmentioning
confidence: 99%