GOVERNORS VS. LEGISLATURES: VETOES, OVERRIDES, AND POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES<sup>1</sup>

Herzik, Eric B.; Wiggins, Charles W.

doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00822.x

Cited by 18 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Elsewhere, we found that governors' personalities are important in shaping their success in state legislatures (Ferguson and Barth 2002), suggesting that previous studies of gubernatorial leadership may have been distinctly underspecified. Breaking with research that emphasizes institutional and structural factors (Bernick and Wiggins 1991;Crew 1992;Gross 1991;Herzik and Wiggins 1989;Thompson 1987), we showed that governors' personalities matter even when other political, economic, and institutional factors are considered. Employing the theory and methodology of David G. Winter (1987), we examined how three gubernatorial motives-power, achievement, and affiliation-intimacy-helped shape governors' success in the legislative arena.…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

American Governors and their Constituents: The Relationship between Gubernatorial Personality and Public Approval

Barth

Ferguson

2002

State Politics Policy Q.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Public approval is an important tool for chief executives. It helps predict their re-election success and it may translate into greater legislative and administrative policy success. Does a governor's personality influence his or her public approval? We address this question by examining the effects of three gubernatorial motives-affiliationintimacy, achievement, and power-on public approval. We hypothesize that governors who are especially motivated by affiliation-intimacy will be more successful with the public. However, we find that governors motivated by a desire for power have greater public approval, while the affiliation-intimacy motive is unrelated to approval. Furthermore, the achievement motive is negatively related to approval in our data. We contrast these results with our earlier findings that a combination of power and achievement motives leads to gubernatorial success in the legislative arena. It appears that personality is important in determining gubernatorial success with both the public and the legislature, but in decidedly different ways.Does a state governor's personality influence his or her public approval and, if so, how? Elsewhere, we found that governors' personalities are important in shaping their success in state legislatures (Ferguson and Barth 2002), suggesting that previous studies of gubernatorial leadership may have been distinctly underspecified. Breaking with research that emphasizes institutional and structural factors (Bernick and Wiggins 1991;Crew 1992;Gross 1991;Herzik and Wiggins 1989;Thompson 1987), we showed that governors' personalities matter even when other political, economic, and institutional factors are considered. Employing the theory and methodology of David G. Winter (1987), we examined how three gubernatorial motives-power, achievement, and affiliation-intimacy-helped shape governors' success in the legislative arena. We found that governors with a combination of high power and achievement motives were significantly more likely to get what they wanted from their state legislatures. The third motive, affiliation-intimacy, was found to have no significant impact on gubernatorial success in

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 95%

American Governors and their Constituents: The Relationship between Gubernatorial Personality and Public Approval

Barth

Ferguson

2002

State Politics Policy Q.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Perhaps the most examined of these formal powers is the governor's veto (e.g., Beyle 1995Beyle , 1999Council of State Governments 1980;Dometrius 1987;Herzik and Wiggins 1989;McGeary 1947;Morehouse 1966Morehouse , 1973Morehouse , 1981Morehouse , 1998Prescott 1950;Wiggins 1980). The veto is conventionally seen as a key component of gubernatorial power, yet systematic evidence of this power remains elusive and some scholars argue that the veto's impact is limited.…”

Section: Gubernatorial Influence In the Legislative Arenamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts: A Test of Pivotal Politics

Wilkins¹,

Young²

2002

Legislative Studies Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Using the "switcher" analysis developed by Krehbiel (1998), we examine the ability of Missouri governors to sway legislators on veto override attempts. Our initial results closely mirror Krehbiel's finding that the chief executive successfully achieves influence at and around the veto pivot, but these results change once we take into account the political party of the legislators. Governors are far more likely to influence legislators from their own party, regardless of legislator ideology. Our study provides a rare systematic analysis of gubernatorial influence in the legislative arena, while also contributing to the current debate over preference-based versus partisanbased theories of legislatures.

show abstract

“…However, that finding may reflect the fact that most of those state legislators subject to limits would not be “termed out” of office until 2000 and later (NCSL ). Nor do Klarner and Karch consider veto overrides despite earlier evidence (see, e.g., Herzik and Wiggins ) suggesting that what drives overrides is substantially different than what drives the governors' decisions to veto legislation.…”

mentioning

confidence: 91%

“…Yet despite the centrality and importance of veto dynamics for both governors and legislatures, there is little empirical evidence on veto dynamics in the American states. Wiggins () and Herzik and Wiggins () report some of the earliest multistate analyses of vetoes and overrides by considering the influence of the states' demographics and the character of the states' governors and legislatures during the 1970s. More recently, Klarner and Karch () discover that the use of the veto by governors over the period 1971–2002 reflects a number of institutional factors including the formal powers of the governors, the partisan composition of legislatures, and aspects of the states' electoral cycles.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Term Limits and Legislative‐Executive Conflict in the American States

Baker

Hedge

2013

Legislative Studies Qtrly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

State governments have experienced considerable institutional change in the last several decades. None appeared at first glance to be as far-reaching as the legislative term limits that were adopted by over 20 states in the 1990s. The evidence to date suggests that term limits have indeed changed the character of many of the states' legislatures, if not always as predicted by their advocates. We report data on veto dynamics over the period 1989-2008 to determine how term limits have impacted legislative-executive relations. Our data both challenge and support what has become the conventional wisdom, i.e., that term limits will weaken legislatures relative to their governors. States with more stringent term limits experienced fewer gubernatorial vetoes but proved more likely to override those vetoes when they were issued. Taken together the evidence suggests that the relationship between governors and legislatures in the wake of term limits is more complex and variable than scholars and others had previously thought.

show abstract

GOVERNORS VS. LEGISLATURES: VETOES, OVERRIDES, AND POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES¹

Cited by 18 publications

References 21 publications

American Governors and their Constituents: The Relationship between Gubernatorial Personality and Public Approval

American Governors and their Constituents: The Relationship between Gubernatorial Personality and Public Approval

The Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts: A Test of Pivotal Politics

Term Limits and Legislative‐Executive Conflict in the American States

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

GOVERNORS VS. LEGISLATURES: VETOES, OVERRIDES, AND POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES1

Cited by 18 publications

References 21 publications

American Governors and their Constituents: The Relationship between Gubernatorial Personality and Public Approval

American Governors and their Constituents: The Relationship between Gubernatorial Personality and Public Approval

The Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts: A Test of Pivotal Politics

Term Limits and Legislative‐Executive Conflict in the American States

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

GOVERNORS VS. LEGISLATURES: VETOES, OVERRIDES, AND POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES¹