Governo Dutra: arrocho salarial e os trabalhadores (1946-1950)

Ferreira, Clausinei

doi:10.11606/d.8.2019.tde-04092019-121705

Cited by 1 publication

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“…In Brazil, the Dutra government (1946)(1947)(1948)(1949)(1950)(1951), which followed immediately after the end of the Vargas era, drastically shifted state orientation regarding monetary policy and pursued free markets with the economic opening towards multinationals and foreign direct investment (Ferreira, 2019).…”

Section: Revealing Growth Coalitions In Brazilmentioning

confidence: 99%

In search of developmental capitalism institutions:

Balestro

Botelho

2021

RBS

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How can we explain that some emerging economies grow faster than others? What explains the sustainability of their growth? Not all types of capitalism in emerging markets contribute equally to sustainable growth rates that undergird development. Comparative capitalism research on European economies temporary growth models aims to more properly grasp change in the varieties of capitalism approach. Adoption of the growth models in emerging markets capitalism research requires attention to integration into the global economy and to political coalitions, and the need to deal with the methodological challenges, given high labor market informality and political instability. This article seeks to make sense of changes in the components of successive growth models throughout a path-dependent capitalist variety, expand the growth model analytical framework by testing elements alongside demand (and supply) based on a case study of Brazil, and explore coalitions in economic reform to identify growth model’s social blocs. The article’s results unveil challenges to the employment of existing concepts and analytical framework; the need to build bridges between growth models and the political economy of development; and an exploratory assessment of growth model contributions to Brazil's postwar development. Thereof, in the long term, interest shifts of economic elites between liberal and non-liberal economic regimes suggest a fragility of repeated attempts to form a durable developmental coalition, a process dynamic that frays state-permeated capitalism positive externalities. It concludes that both path dependent developmental institutions, which hinder change, and growth instability limit the possibilities of designing institutional reforms out of the middle-income trap.

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Section: Revealing Growth Coalitions In Brazilmentioning

confidence: 99%