Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting

Abstract

* * * * Are governments responsive to public preferences when legislating in international organizations? This paper demonstrates that governments respond to domestic public opinion even when acting at the international level. Specifically, we examine conflict in the European Union's primary legislative body, the Council of the European Union (EU). We argue that domestic electoral incentives compel governments to react to public opinion. Analyzing a unique dataset on all legislative decisions adopted in the Council since 1999, we show that governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that extend the level and scope of EU authority when their domestic electorates are skeptical about the EU. We also find that governments are more responsive when the issue of European integration is salient in domestic party politics. Our findings demonstrate that governments can use the international stage to signal their responsiveness to public concerns and that such signals resonate in the domestic political debate.Key words: responsiveness, legislative behavior, Council, public opinion, European Union * The order of authors is determined alphabetically. The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from TheLeverhulme Trust (RF-2013-345) Our findings demonstrate that governments' opposition to legislative proposals is indeed shaped by public opinion on European integration wherever these proposals extend the level and scope of European integration. We also find that governments are more likely to signal their positions in the Council when the issue gains importance in domestic party competition and that these signals resonate in the national public sphere. Our findings thus contribute not only to our understanding of policy-making in the EU, but may also have broader significance as IOs increasingly face pressures to deepen cooperation and increase transparency and accountability to domestic audiences. Moreover, our study enhances our understanding of democratic responsiveness by highlighting that governments use the international stage to signal to voters at home that they care about their views. Government Responsiveness in International OrganizationsThe relationship between public preferences and government policy is at the heart of theories of Hence, as there are few benefits (the policy will be passed by the majority in any case) and several costs, it is not surprising that opposition is still relative rare, accounting for less than 2 H1: Governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that affect the authority of the EU when domestic public opinion is negatively disposed towards the EU than when public opinion is positively disposed towards the EU.The extent to which governments wish to use opposition votes as a signal to their publics is also shaped by domestic political competition. We expect that governments' responsiveness is higher when the issue of European integration is salient in the domestic context. Since signal responsiveness aims at communicating positions (and shifts in pos...

Signals to Their Parliaments? Governments’ Use of Votes and Policy Statements in the EU Council

“…We had expected the elections to be of significance, but perhaps the effect– if any exists – is more limited and similar to the findings reported in Hagemann et al . (). These authors found that governments are more likely to oppose the majority in the Council in response to public opinion only in areas that include decisions to expand the EU powers further.…”

“…() find that the presence of strong economic domestic interests dictate when a government decides to vote “no” or “abstain” in the Council (see also Mühlböck and Tosun ()). Public opinion – in particular the public's attitude towards EU integration – has also been shown to have an effect in a number of core policy areas (Hagemann et al, ). Others have found that a North–South or a North–South‐East divide exists (Mattila, ), and that at times a left–right cleavage can also be detected (Hagemann and Hoyland, ; Mattila, ).…”

National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union

“…This allows us to focus on conflicts of interests between the parliament and government that arise from incentives the government faces in the consensus-oriented Council, rather than from policy disagreements. Hagemann et al (2017) and others have shown that governments are responsive to domestic policy preferences in the Council. Considering the parliament and government as having the same preferences is not inconsistent with these findings.…”

“…Hagemann et al. () and others have shown that governments are responsive to domestic policy preferences in the Council. Considering the parliament and government as having the same preferences is not inconsistent with these findings.…”

Liberal Intergovernmentalism in the Councils of the EU: A Baseline Theory?

“…The findings are inconclusive when it comes to the role of party ideology (Bailer et al, 2015;Hagemann, 2008;Hagemann and Hoyland, 2008;Hagemann et al, 2017;Hosli et al, 2011;Mattila, , 2009. Several studies have made use of the voting records to gain information on conflict patterns.…”