Government–Opposition Dynamics in Spain under the Pressure of Economic Collapse and the Debt Crisis

Palau, Anna M.; Márquez, Luz Muñoz; Chaqués‐Bonafont, Laura

doi:10.1080/13572334.2014.939565

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 40 publications

(43 reference statements)

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“…In the consensual model, parties can cooperate, especially in the most relevant issues in terms of the policy decision-making process. Opposition parties often agree with the government or attempt to find a consensus and are unlikely to constantly reject the government's proposals (Palau et al, 2015). Generally, opposition parties need to face two kinds of pressure from different directions.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Relations Between Government and Parliamentary Opposition in Spain

Rydzewska¹

2021

ppsy

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The COVID-19 strongly affected the states all over the world in several aspects, Spain, being an inglorious leader in terms of the number of infections in Europe, was highly afflicted by the coronavirus and further consequences. After problems with forming the government, which was caused by substantial political polarization, a new incumbent coalition needed to face new challenges, which was strictly connected with managing the coronavirus crisis. The article’s main aim is to present how the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the political situation in Spain by analyzing the relations between the ruling government and the parliamentary opposition.

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Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Relations Between Government and Parliamentary Opposition in Spain

Rydzewska¹

2021

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“…The maximum number of return amendments received by an executive bill is 11. Other indicators of political conflict like final voting are not considered in the analysis because they only apply in the case of decree-laws and organic laws (in Spain there is no final voting on all other types of law, see Palau, Muñoz and Chaqués-Bonafont, 2015).…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining interest group access to parliamentary committees

Chaqués‐Bonafont¹,

Márquez²

2016

West European Politics

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This article explains why parliamentary groups invite interest groups to the parliamentary arena. It argues, interest groups access to committees not only reflect policy-makers' needs for information, and expertise but also party preferences and institutional factors such as the type of government, parliamentary committees structure, and committee's agenda capacity.Results show interest groups access to the parliamentary arena increases under minority governments, in the case of highly conflictual issues, and when the number of permanent committees increases. Also, results demonstrate parliamentary groups invite interest organizations following different logics -problem-solving or confrontation logic-depending on the type of functions they have to perform -legislative and oversight activities-. The article uses a novel comprehensive database with information on the appearances of all interest groups in the Spanish parliament from 1996 to 2015.

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Going in circles? The influence of the electoral cycle on the party behaviour in parliament

Schwalbach

2021

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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Most analyses dealing with the interaction of parties in parliament assume their interests to be fixed between elections. However, a rational perspective suggests that parties adapt their behaviour throughout the legislative term. I argue that this change is influenced by incentives and possibilities to shape legislation and the need to distinguish oneself from competitors. While for government parties it matters whether they have to share offices, for opposition parties the influence on policy-making is important. By examining the sentiment of all parliamentary speeches on bill proposals from six established democracies over more than twenty years, I analyse institutional and contextual effects. The results show that single-party governments tend to become more positive towards the end of the legislative cycle compared to coalition governments. On the other hand, opposition parties under minority governments, or with more institutionalised influence on government bills, show a more negative trend in comparison to their counterparts.

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Government–Opposition Dynamics in Spain under the Pressure of Economic Collapse and the Debt Crisis

Cited by 10 publications

References 40 publications

Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Relations Between Government and Parliamentary Opposition in Spain

Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Relations Between Government and Parliamentary Opposition in Spain

Explaining interest group access to parliamentary committees

Going in circles? The influence of the electoral cycle on the party behaviour in parliament

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