2018
DOI: 10.3386/w24879
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Government Decentralization Under Changing State Capacity: Experimental Evidence From Paraguay

Abstract: Standard models of hierarchy assume that agents and middle managers are better informed than principals about how to implement a particular task. We estimate the value of the informational advantage held by supervisors -middle managers -when ministerial leadership -the principalintroduced a new monitoring technology aimed at improving the performance of agricultural extension agents (AEAs) in rural Paraguay. Our approach employs a novel experimental design that elicited treatment-priority rankings from supervi… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…7 Several studies consider different methods to improve the provision of extension services. For instance, cell-phone-based monitoring of extension workers can help solve agency problems and increase the number of farmers reached (Dal B ó et al, 2020). Alternatively, researchers have considered efforts to better select, incentivize, and train the farmers that the extension service partners with (Beaman et al, 2020;BenYishay and Mobarak, 2018;Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu, 2017;Beaman and Dillon, 2018;BenYishay et al, 2020).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7 Several studies consider different methods to improve the provision of extension services. For instance, cell-phone-based monitoring of extension workers can help solve agency problems and increase the number of farmers reached (Dal B ó et al, 2020). Alternatively, researchers have considered efforts to better select, incentivize, and train the farmers that the extension service partners with (Beaman et al, 2020;BenYishay and Mobarak, 2018;Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu, 2017;Beaman and Dillon, 2018;BenYishay et al, 2020).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…I contribute to the literature on enforcement and the incentives of local bureaucrats (Balán, Bergeron, Tourek, & Weigel, 2022;Amodio, Choi, De Giorgi, & Rahman, 2021;Khan, Khwaja, & Olken, 2016), and the use of technology to improve monitoring (Callen, Gulzar, Hasanain, Khan, & Rezaee, 2018;Dal B ó, Finan, Li, & Schechter, 2018;Dhaliwal & Hanna, 2017;de Rochambeau, 2020). The answer to the existence of spillover effects speaks directly to the important question of "How much do improvements in enforcement generate displacement in wrongdoing?"…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%