Government budgeting and the quest for value-for-money outcomes in Australia

Wanna, John

doi:10.22459/vm.01.2018.02

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 7 publications

(11 reference statements)

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“…There are several works with and by current and former graduate students, as well as the author, that John was instrumental in encouraging, along with other studies he co-authored, but that will not be the focus of this chapter (see Gash 2005;Kelly and Lindquist 2003;Lindquist 2010, 2015;Forster and Wanna 1990;Wanna 2011Wanna , 2015Wanna , 2018Wanna , 2021. responsibilities for expenditure management and later for a succession of budget and management reform initiatives.…”

Section: Monitoring Evolution and Innovation In Australian Budgetingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Australian budgeting and beyond: Exploring John Wanna’s scholarly surplus

Lindquist¹

2021

Politics, Policy and Public Administration in Theory and Practice

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When I think of defining encounters with John Wanna, where I developed a measure of him as a scholar and person, he was not 'in the room'. The first involved receiving an email from him because John had been to Ottawa and learned about my work on the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat in the context of government restructuring and deficitreduction strategies (Lindquist 1994(Lindquist , 1996. He thought it similar to his 'thick', organisationally and historically informed, and recently published work on Australian budgeting and its Department of Finance (Wanna, Kelly and Forster 2000). Two invitations flowed from this: the first was to contribute a chapter to a comparative collection he was planning on Controlling Public Expenditure (Wanna, Jensen and de Vries 2003); and the second, his insistence that, during my first journey to Australia, 1 I take a 24-hour side trip to fly to Brisbane (since 'nothing was happening in 1 This was for an intriguing symposium in May 2001 organised by Meredith Edwards and John Langford on 'New Players, Partners and Processes: A Public Sector Without Boundaries?' in early April 2001, which resulted in a book collection (Edwards and Langford 2002).

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Section: Monitoring Evolution and Innovation In Australian Budgetingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Australian budgeting and beyond: Exploring John Wanna’s scholarly surplus

Lindquist¹

2021

Politics, Policy and Public Administration in Theory and Practice

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Reforms and budgetary oversight roles in Tanzania

Mkasiwa

2019

JPBAFM

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the new Budget Act (2015) and the new budget cycle influence and were influenced by the contextual environment of the Tanzanian parliament and how this changed parliamentarians’ (MPs) budgetary oversight roles. Design/methodology/approach The paper employed analytical concepts explained in the contextual framework proposed by Alsharari et al. (2015) to explore changes in budgetary oversight roles after the implementation of the reforms. Interviews, video clips and document review were employed in the data collection. Data were analyzed using the thematic approach. Findings The values of the new Budget Act and the new budget cycle were in conflict with the prevailing institutions, political and power aspects. The MPs modified a few provisions in the new Budget Act and in the new budget cycle. Legitimating budgetary oversight roles as a result of institutional pressure emerged but stopped. Although there was a change in MPs formal powers and MPs involvement in budgetary oversight, there was stability as the change was ineffective. Research limitations/implications The paper only extracted relevant aspects of the contextual framework, which were sufficient to achieve the objective of the paper. Moreover, the study was conducted only a few years after the implementation of the reforms. Therefore, it might be too early to reach conclusions. Yet, the paper serves as the basis for further studies investigating changes in budgetary oversight roles after the implementation of the reforms. Practical implications In order for the parliament to hold the government accountable to the electorate, there is a need for reforming the nature of the government system, improving MPs capacity, harmonizing Budget Act with prevailing constitution and demonstrating the political will to use MPs’ formal powers. The findings suggest that effective change in budgetary oversight by focusing on formal institutions only is unlikely. Originality/value This paper provides a more robust explanation on how the integration of institutional, political and power aspects shape budgetary oversight roles in parliaments. It is the first paper to explore accounting change using the contextual theoretical framework in an organization of a parliamentary nature. The paper responds to Kim’s (2018) call for conducting case studies to explore changes in budgetary oversight roles by investigating potential attributes of institutions when operating in practice.

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Government budgeting and the quest for value-for-money outcomes in Australia

Cited by 2 publications

References 7 publications

Australian budgeting and beyond: Exploring John Wanna’s scholarly surplus

Australian budgeting and beyond: Exploring John Wanna’s scholarly surplus

Reforms and budgetary oversight roles in Tanzania

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