Governing the banking system: an assessment of resilience based on Elinor Ostrom's design principles

Salter, Alexander William; Tarko, Vlad

doi:10.1017/s1744137418000401

Cited by 23 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 61 publications

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“…Antifragility has similarities to Ostrom's (2010) theory of resilient governance. Such resilience entails more than the mere ability to bounce back from shocks; resilience encompasses robustness and adaptability (Salter and Tarko, 2019).…”

Section: Entrepreneursmentioning

confidence: 99%

Innovative Entrepreneurship as a Collaborative Effort: An Institutional Framework

Elert

Henrekson

2021

FNT in Entrepreneurship

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We demonstrate how successful entrepreneurship depends on a collaborative innovation bloc (CIB), a system of innovation that evolves spontaneously and within which activity takes place through time. A CIB consists of six pools of economic skills from which people are drawn or recruited to form part of a collaborative team, which is necessary for innovation-based venturing to flourish. The six pools include entrepreneurs, inventors, early-and later-stage financiers, key personnel, and customers. We show how the application of the CIB perspective can help make institutional and evolutionary economics more concrete, relevant, and persuasive, especially regarding institutional prescriptions. Generally, we envision an institutional framework that improves the antifragility of CIBs and the economic system as a whole, thus enabling individual CIBs and the broader economic system to thrive when faced with adversity.

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Section: Entrepreneursmentioning

confidence: 99%

Innovative Entrepreneurship as a Collaborative Effort: An Institutional Framework

Elert

Henrekson

2021

FNT in Entrepreneurship

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“…There are those approaches that go further, beyond a conception of 'taming finance', to one in which knowledge about uncertainty itself is a problem necessitating concern, and in which there are subsequent significant limitations to relevant institutional design (Salter and Tarko, 2019).…”

Section: The Limits Of Uncertain Financial Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…It raises the question of whether or not uncertainty is ultimately "beyond science and rationality and thus beyond a politics of control or a science of management and mitigation" (Jarvis, 2010: 17). This approach features in discourses of 'resilience' that have become prevalent in recent years (Salter and Tarko, 2019), especially associated with an engagement with complexity theory by influential central bank officials, such as Andrew Haldane at the Bank of England, and an outlook that essentially holds that "the financial sector produces a form of uncertainty that cannot be addressed through traditional regulatory mechanisms" (Brassett and Holmes, 2016: 379). While productive and a radical departure for much economic and finance theory, the conceptual move to understanding financial markets in terms of complexity theory still holds that accurate modelling is possible for monitoring future uncertainty in financial markets (e.g., Battiston et al, 2016).…”

Section: The Limits Of Uncertain Financial Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

The legacy of Frank H. Knight for the politics of financial governance

Clarke

2021

Journal of Institutional Economics

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The politics of financial governance under conditions of uncertainty has re-emerged as a significant issue for scholars of International Political Economy and related fields, not least because of the fallout from the 2007-2008 financial crisis. In this article I assess the legacy of Frank H. Knight's Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit for debates about reconceptualising financial governance and fostering financial stability. I argue Knight's book is productive in assisting understanding of the fallacies of the ‘risk-based’ economic theory tending to underpin financial governance, in particular drawing attention to the limitations of social scientific knowledge that reduce governance capacity and increase uncertainty in financial markets. I further argue, after Knight's deliberately paradoxical approach, that uncertainty in finance might be beyond regulation but at the same time there is still a societal need to attempt to achieve a politics of uncertainty that can cope with ignorance of the future through experimental governmental efforts.

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“…Commonly used methods of measuring efficiency are based on three approaches: index, parametric and nonparametric [12]. Regarding banks, among the classic efficiency indicators are the following: profitability, profitability, the burden on the financial result, and employment efficiency [13].…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling the Behavior of Banks in Instability Conditions

Burtnyak

Malytska

2021

jpnu

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The analysis of models of activity of banking structures in the conditions of perfect and imperfect competition is carried out. Production functions for financial companies are considered. Models of the bank's work as an institution of delegated monitoring are described. Models of dynamics of financial resources are analyzed, allow to describe processes of evolution of own capital of bank depending on dynamics of the involved resources and the policy of accumulation realized by it. The considered models and methods are based on the definition of a bank (a financial company) as some abstract object, which is characterized by input and output parameters, as well as the function that connects them. This approach to some extent allows adapting traditional models of research of industrial enterprises and organizations to the analysis of the activities of banking structures. Therefore, one of the main tasks is to optimize internal functioning. Under such conditions, it is especially important to consider the bank as a holistic complex dynamic system operating in an unstable transition economy and the use of economic and mathematical methods and models to study the processes taking place in the bank, assess its effectiveness, identify areas and ways to improve management banking activities. Based on the analysis of the main economic and mathematical models of behavior of financial companies in a monopolistic market, we can conclude that each model characterizes a certain aspect of financial market development by the situation. Production functions for a bank (financial firm) are built, where the problem of classification of these factors into input and output is significant. A wide class of economic and mathematical models is considered, in which the activity of financial and banking institutions is treated as financial intermediaries. The theory of delegated monitoring is generalized, which in the general case assumes that in conditions when there is an effect of the growth of income from scale, individual lenders prefer to delegate functions of control (monitoring) of the behavior of entrepreneurs in whose projects they have invested to special intermediary firms. banks. The analysis of the development of the banking sector of Ukraine showed that a further gradual slowdown in its pace is expected due to changes in conditions in global financial markets and market saturation.

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Governing the banking system: an assessment of resilience based on Elinor Ostrom's design principles

Cited by 23 publications

References 61 publications

Innovative Entrepreneurship as a Collaborative Effort: An Institutional Framework

Innovative Entrepreneurship as a Collaborative Effort: An Institutional Framework

The legacy of Frank H. Knight for the politics of financial governance

Modeling the Behavior of Banks in Instability Conditions

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