Governing 'dual-use' research in Canada: A policy review

Abstract

National and international organisations have implemented governance mechanisms to address a diversity of ethical, security and policy challenges raised by advances in research and innovation. These challenges become particularly complex when research or innovations are considered 'dualuse', i.e. can lead to both beneficial and harmful uses, and in particular, civilian (peaceful) and military (hostile) applications. While many countries have mechanisms (i.e. export controls) to govern the transfer of dual-use technology (e.g. nuclear, cryptography), it is much less clear how dual-use research from across the range of academic disciplines can or should be governed. Using the Canadian research and policy context as case study, this paper will first, examine the governance mechanisms currently in place to mitigate the negative implications of dual-use research and innovation; second, compare these with other relevant international governance contexts; and finally, propose some ways forward (i.e. a risk analysis approach) for developing more robust governance mechanisms.

Updating the Wassenaar debate once again: Surveillance, intrusion software, and ambiguity

“…This recommendation can be accompanied with a corollary. 15 The Wassenaar debate supports the arguments that the concept of dual-use has already long ago lost most of its analytical power (Burkart and McCourt, 2017;Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018;Rath et al, 2014;Rajeswari, 1998;Williams-Jones et al, 2014). If it is admitted that cyber security differs from conventional security, it is also logical to make a subsequent policy recommendation:…”

“…Although many of the items are listed with specific operational ranges, the definitions are still encompassing and imprecise. In general, this vagueness reflects the increasing problems with the concept of dual-use technologies (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018;Rath et al, 2014;Rajeswari, 1998;Williams-Jones et al, 2014). Thus, to see the forest from the trees, it is better to again focus on the historical changes and amendments, augmented by the fundamental framings and exclusion criteria used in the Wassenaar Arrangement.…”

“…In other words, the continuing alterations made to export controls may have important implications not only for the private sector cyber security industry but also for academic computer science research of computer security. As has long been the case with export controls for cryptography and science in general (Bohm et al, 1999;Evans and Valdivia, 2012;Williams-Jones et al, 2014), cross-border research and development, education, and the freedom of speech might all be exposed to the cyber security policy changes and initiatives elaborated. This paper proceeds by discussing the historical background in terms of international venues and historical ideas, ideologies, and legacies, including the the 1990s debates on export controls for cryptography.…”

How does export compliance influence the internationalization of firms: is it a thread or an opportunity?

“…Researchers/ innovators and end-users are a different level of intention for dual-use items. While researchers/ innovators may intend a purpose and have no idea that a user might convert the innovation or research for other purposes, mainly destructive and criminal, and in the opposite, researchers may have no specific end-use of the item in mind (Williams-Jones et al 2014). …”

Self-tracking the microbiome: where do we go from here?

“…There is then the potential to exacerbate existing health disparities. In addition, the analysis of one’s personal data by a third party also raises the problem of dual-use research and innovation [ 34 ] and its precautionary aspects, namely, when data sharing can lead to both beneficial and harmful uses [ 35 ].…”