Governance Role of Auditors and Legal Environment: Evidence from Corporate Disclosure Transparency

Han, Soongsoo; Kang, Tony; Yoo, Yong Keun

doi:10.1080/09638180.2011.599928

Cited by 39 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…The findings reveal that corruption is deeply rooted in Bangladesh's society. Similar to Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov's (2010) culture index, the World Bank's (2010) Governance Indicators Data and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny's (1998) data [see also Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003;Han, Kang, & Yoo, 2012], this study finds lower rates of enforcement in Bangladesh compared with India and Pakistan. This is due to higher levels of corruption, a factor which weakens the enforcement of laws and is marked by a secretive culture.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 68%

“…Hence, company managements are less likely to pursue a high level of IFRS compliance. Moreover, using the World Bank's Governance Indicators Data (2010) and data from La Porta et al (1998) [see also Leuz et al (2003) and Han et al (2012)], the present study reveals a lower rate of enforcement in Bangladesh compared with India and Pakistan. This is due to higher levels of corruption, a factor which weakens law enforcement.…”

Section: Conclusion Implications and Scope For Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 92%

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The impact of cultural factors on the implementation of global accounting standards (IFRS) in a developing country

Nurunnabi

2015

Advances in Accounting

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 68%

Section: Conclusion Implications and Scope For Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 92%

The impact of cultural factors on the implementation of global accounting standards (IFRS) in a developing country

Nurunnabi

2015

Advances in Accounting

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“…With respect to board size, theoretically, increased managerial monitoring associated with larger boards can have a positive influence on corporate disclosures, including CG ones and performance (Jensen, 1993;Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In a similar vein, and with respect to audit firm, larger audit firms have greater financial strength, knowledge, and independence, which can affect positively on voluntary CG disclosure (DeAngelo, 1981;Eng & Mak, 2003;Han et al, 2012;Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Economically, the implications of these findings can be quantified as, a one standard deviation change (increase) in BSZ, AFZ, and CGC may be associated with about 0.40% (1.76 × 0.231), 12.45% (49% × 0.254) and 9.66% (30% × 0.322) change (increase) in the level of the SCGI, respectively.…”

Section: Empirical Results From Multivariate Regression Analysesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The appointment of external auditors to examine company accounts is an important governance mechanism for monitoring managers to reduce agency conflicts in modern corporations, whereby ownership is separate from control (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007;Han, Kang, & Yoo, 2012). One way of determining external auditor quality is the level of disclosure, and in fact, audit firm size has been suggested to have a positive effect on corporate disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003;Owusu-Ansah, 1998) and audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981).…”

Section: Hypothesis 4 (H4)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Boards and Ownership Structure as Antecedents of Corporate Governance Disclosure in Saudi Arabian Publicly Listed Corporations

et al. 2015

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This study investigates whether and to what extent publicly listed corporations voluntarily comply with and disclose recommended good corporate governance (CG) practices, and distinctively examines whether the observed cross-sectional differences in such CG disclosures can be explained by ownership and board mechanisms with specific focus on Saudi Arabia. The study's results suggest that corporations with larger boards, a Big 4 auditor, higher government ownership, a CG committee, and higher institutional ownership disclose considerably more than those that are not. By contrast, the study finds that an increase in block ownership significantly reduces CG disclosure. The study's results are generally robust to a number of econometric models that control for different types of disclosure indices, firm-specific characteristics, and firm-level fixed effects.

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“…According to the"agency and stakeholder theories, audit firms are able to influence the level and and quality of their corporate governance disclosure (Barako et al, 2006). Such firms are considered to be external corporate governance mechanisms that oversee management activities through the firm's financial performance and disclosures (Kang & Yoo, 2012). Evidence points to the fact that large-sized audit firms (big 4) adopt superior auditing performance standards compared to their small audit counterparts (Schiehll, Terra, & Victor, 2013).…”

Section: Proportion Of Independent Directors and Voluntary Corporate mentioning

confidence: 99%

Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure Innovative Evidence: The Case of Jordan

Almanasir

Shivaraj

2017

J. Rev. Global Econ.

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This paper aimed to assess the corporate governance voluntary disclosure level and the impact of a set of corporate governances (CG) attributes on the level to which corporate governance voluntary disclosure is conducted in Jordan. Another objective was to determine if Jordanian industrial listed corporations adhere to and disclose good CG practices voluntarily, and if they do, to determine the factors influencing such disclosure. This study employed 61 industrial listed firms for the years 2010-2014. The research developed a general voluntary CG disclosure index composing of 15 Jordanian Corporate Governance Codes and gauged the relationship via pooled OLS and regression method. The results indicated that the proposed Jordanian Corporate Governance Index (JCGI) enhanced voluntary corporate governance disclosure among Jordanian listed firms over the examined years. They also showed varying levels of CG disclosures in different scenarios; 1) it is lower in firms with higher managerial ownership and 2) higher relative to the independent directors' proportion on the board, audit firm size, and audit committee presence with institutional ownership. Evidence on the compliance level towards the CG code in Amman Stock Exchange is unique and the study is distinct as it provides a pioneering evidence of the achieved compliance level.

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Governance Role of Auditors and Legal Environment: Evidence from Corporate Disclosure Transparency

Cited by 39 publications

References 43 publications

The impact of cultural factors on the implementation of global accounting standards (IFRS) in a developing country

The impact of cultural factors on the implementation of global accounting standards (IFRS) in a developing country

Corporate Boards and Ownership Structure as Antecedents of Corporate Governance Disclosure in Saudi Arabian Publicly Listed Corporations

Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure Innovative Evidence: The Case of Jordan

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