“…Reuver (2011) and Reuver and Bouwman (2012) highlighted the relevance of informal control and trust as mechanisms of governance that generate a third and different way of governance at the same level of market and hierarchy. At the same time, they argue that these mechanisms of governance can be used in combination by organizations; they may partially overlap to configure particular ways of governance forms.…”
Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The majority of the academic literature focuses on legal aspects of the regulations that should be designed to control the behavior of vertically integrated operators (Cave, 2006;Crandall et al, 2010;Howell et al, 2010;Waterman & Choi, 2011). A few authors approach this topic from an economic perspective in analogous activities, like cable television (Waterman & Choi, 2011;Yoo, 2002) or the electric power industry (Howell et al, 2010), and from the perspective of governance forms in the mobile service (Reuver & Bouwman, 2012) and IT outsourcing industries (Goo & Huang, 2008). There is some discussion concerning network neutrality, but a few aspects, like ISP integration into other activities, have received little academic attention (Waterman & Choi, 2011).…”
Section: Research Design and Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Reuver and Bouwman (2012), in their analysis of value network, expanded the analysis to consider relationships with organizations that, according to the respondent's perception, are part of his organization's value network. However, that procedure seems inadequate to study the degree of integration of governance forms within an industry because a global assessment of the governance forms of the primary activities in that industry's value chain is then advised.…”
Section: Research Design and Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although these developments are described as a whole, TCE considers the transaction characteristics and the mechanism of control as different steps in the selection of the governance form (Dekker, 2004;Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003;Williamson, 1989). Reuver and Bouwman (2012) also highlighted the need to differentiate the economic institution of transaction (market, hierarchy, and hybrid form) and the method of organizing the action (formal and informal controls).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, a number of studies was conducted on the selection of the governance form by examining transaction characteristics (Crandall, Eisenach, & Litan, 2010;Howell et al, 2010;Neumann, 2010;Waterman & Choi, 2011), the definition of the control structure based on the transaction characteristics (Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013;Johansson & Siverbo, 2011;Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000) and the influence of actionorganizing mechanisms on relationship outcomes (Reuver, 2011;Reuver & Bouwman, 2012;Eriksson & Laan, 2007;Langfield-Smith, 2008;Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003;Şengün & Wasti, 2011).…”
The present paper employs the perspective of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to analyze the relevance of formal and informal controls in selecting the governance form. The evidence supports the influence of frequency, information sharing and relation-specific investments as a cause of control mechanisms, and the effect of these factors on the choice of the governance form, but there is no evidence about the combined interaction between these variables. The present work proposes that there is a mediation effect of formal and informal norms on the relationship between the TCE variables (frequency, information asymmetry and relation-specific investments) and the governance form. We applied Structural Equation Modelling to companies in the telecommunications sector in Spain. Our results confirm the opposite effect of formal and informal controls on the selection of governance forms and the mediation effect of these mechanisms of control on the selection of the governance form.KEYWORDS | Governance forms, integration, formal control, informal control, transaction characteristics.
RESUMO
O presente trabalho emprega o ponto de vista da Economia dos Custos de Transação (ECT) para analisar a relevância dos controles formais e informais na seleção da forma de governança. A evidência apoia a influência da frequência, compartilhamento de informações e investimentos específicos como causa dos mecanismos de controle, e o efeito desses fatores sobre a escolha da forma de governança. Entretanto não há nenhuma evidência sobre as interações entre essas variáveis. Este trabalho propõe que existe um efeito de mediação das normas informais e formais sobre a relação entre as variáveis da ECT (frequência, informações assimétricas e investimentos específicos) e a forma de governança. A Modelagem de Equações Estruturais é aplicada a empresas do setor de telecomunicações da Espanha. Os resultados obtidos confirmam o efeito oposto de controles formais e informais e o efeito de mediação dos mecanismos de controle sobre a seleção da forma de governança.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE | Formas de governança, integração, controle formal, controle informal, caracterís-ticas da transação.
RESUMEN
El presente trabajo emplea la perspectiva de la Economía de los Costes de Transacción (ECT) para ana-
RAE-Revista de Administração de Empresas | FGV/EAESP
“…Reuver (2011) and Reuver and Bouwman (2012) highlighted the relevance of informal control and trust as mechanisms of governance that generate a third and different way of governance at the same level of market and hierarchy. At the same time, they argue that these mechanisms of governance can be used in combination by organizations; they may partially overlap to configure particular ways of governance forms.…”
Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The majority of the academic literature focuses on legal aspects of the regulations that should be designed to control the behavior of vertically integrated operators (Cave, 2006;Crandall et al, 2010;Howell et al, 2010;Waterman & Choi, 2011). A few authors approach this topic from an economic perspective in analogous activities, like cable television (Waterman & Choi, 2011;Yoo, 2002) or the electric power industry (Howell et al, 2010), and from the perspective of governance forms in the mobile service (Reuver & Bouwman, 2012) and IT outsourcing industries (Goo & Huang, 2008). There is some discussion concerning network neutrality, but a few aspects, like ISP integration into other activities, have received little academic attention (Waterman & Choi, 2011).…”
Section: Research Design and Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Reuver and Bouwman (2012), in their analysis of value network, expanded the analysis to consider relationships with organizations that, according to the respondent's perception, are part of his organization's value network. However, that procedure seems inadequate to study the degree of integration of governance forms within an industry because a global assessment of the governance forms of the primary activities in that industry's value chain is then advised.…”
Section: Research Design and Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although these developments are described as a whole, TCE considers the transaction characteristics and the mechanism of control as different steps in the selection of the governance form (Dekker, 2004;Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003;Williamson, 1989). Reuver and Bouwman (2012) also highlighted the need to differentiate the economic institution of transaction (market, hierarchy, and hybrid form) and the method of organizing the action (formal and informal controls).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, a number of studies was conducted on the selection of the governance form by examining transaction characteristics (Crandall, Eisenach, & Litan, 2010;Howell et al, 2010;Neumann, 2010;Waterman & Choi, 2011), the definition of the control structure based on the transaction characteristics (Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013;Johansson & Siverbo, 2011;Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000) and the influence of actionorganizing mechanisms on relationship outcomes (Reuver, 2011;Reuver & Bouwman, 2012;Eriksson & Laan, 2007;Langfield-Smith, 2008;Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003;Şengün & Wasti, 2011).…”
The present paper employs the perspective of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to analyze the relevance of formal and informal controls in selecting the governance form. The evidence supports the influence of frequency, information sharing and relation-specific investments as a cause of control mechanisms, and the effect of these factors on the choice of the governance form, but there is no evidence about the combined interaction between these variables. The present work proposes that there is a mediation effect of formal and informal norms on the relationship between the TCE variables (frequency, information asymmetry and relation-specific investments) and the governance form. We applied Structural Equation Modelling to companies in the telecommunications sector in Spain. Our results confirm the opposite effect of formal and informal controls on the selection of governance forms and the mediation effect of these mechanisms of control on the selection of the governance form.KEYWORDS | Governance forms, integration, formal control, informal control, transaction characteristics.
RESUMO
O presente trabalho emprega o ponto de vista da Economia dos Custos de Transação (ECT) para analisar a relevância dos controles formais e informais na seleção da forma de governança. A evidência apoia a influência da frequência, compartilhamento de informações e investimentos específicos como causa dos mecanismos de controle, e o efeito desses fatores sobre a escolha da forma de governança. Entretanto não há nenhuma evidência sobre as interações entre essas variáveis. Este trabalho propõe que existe um efeito de mediação das normas informais e formais sobre a relação entre as variáveis da ECT (frequência, informações assimétricas e investimentos específicos) e a forma de governança. A Modelagem de Equações Estruturais é aplicada a empresas do setor de telecomunicações da Espanha. Os resultados obtidos confirmam o efeito oposto de controles formais e informais e o efeito de mediação dos mecanismos de controle sobre a seleção da forma de governança.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE | Formas de governança, integração, controle formal, controle informal, caracterís-ticas da transação.
RESUMEN
El presente trabajo emplea la perspectiva de la Economía de los Costes de Transacción (ECT) para ana-
RAE-Revista de Administração de Empresas | FGV/EAESP
In this entry we discuss the role of business models in the mobile telecommunications domain, considering technology trends at the level of hardware, infrastructure (4G and LTE as first release), platforms (operating systems, network based platforms, and service aggregator platforms) and presentation protocols (HTML 5), and how they affect end‐user services or applications. With regard to business models, we adopt a service or application centered approach, based on platform concepts, discussing several business model frameworks and their relevance to mobile applications, specifically for networked enterprises (or micro‐ecosystems). Future trends are also discussed from a convergence perspective with a particular emphasis on ubiquitous computing and smart living concepts.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.