2020
DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2020.1835324
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Governance, Fragility and Insurgency in the Sahel: A Hybrid Political Order in the Making

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Cited by 21 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 20 publications
(9 reference statements)
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“…These contributions are broadly relevant, as the EU becomes increasingly surrounded by hybrid political orders (e.g. in Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Sahel) (Bøås & Strazzari, 2020;Cambanis et al, 2019;Santini et al, 2020).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…These contributions are broadly relevant, as the EU becomes increasingly surrounded by hybrid political orders (e.g. in Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Sahel) (Bøås & Strazzari, 2020;Cambanis et al, 2019;Santini et al, 2020).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These findings reveal two sets of challenges for the EU to join the "geopolitical game" in the Middle East, and by extension also in North Africa and the broader neighbourhood where hybrid actors increasingly define political order (e.g. in Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Sahel) (Bøås & Strazzari, 2020;Cambanis et al, 2019;Santini et al, 2020). EU foreign policy discourse and practice on hybrid actors complicates both local/national and transnational/regional engagement.…”
Section: Ready For Geopolitical Contestation?mentioning
confidence: 97%
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“…17 The absence of such functions has as suggested by Morten Bøås and Francesco Strazzari, as a hale mark of the Sahelian states, and is a hallmark of many other states as well, and has, as we shall see in the next section, been taken advantage off by jihadists, especially the lack of security for the local rural population. 18 In this case, both sides produced important insights: spaces are seldom ungoverned; jihadists can establish themselves in relatively functioning states; yet areas where the state is weak seem to result in possibilities for these organizations to grow stronger. In this way, two (JNIM and Shabaab) out of three of the strongest jihadist organizations in Africa seem to have emerged from civil war zones and areas with weak state control.…”
Section: The Great Debatesmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Our account of entangled (in)securities therefore builds on assemblage theorizing and the myriad ways in which it has advanced our understanding of emergent political orders in the Sahel. These have been conceptualized as ‘hybrid’ (Raineri and Strazzari, 2019) or ‘heterarchical’ (Hüsken and Klute, 2015), marked by blurry demarcations and shared sovereignty between state and non-state actors; they are ‘fluctuating, entangling and disentangling’ (Hüsken and Klute, 2015: 324) and ‘complex, often kaleidoscopic political configurations that have shifted away from any aspiration to be monopolizing systems of governance and patronage and can best be understood as a multitude of shifting alliances due to competition among networks of patronage’ (Bøås and Strazzari, 2020: 11). While these networks of patronage are unavoidably transnational, their composition has recently started to change.…”
Section: Transnational Entanglements and Sahelian (In)security Assemb...mentioning
confidence: 99%