Governance and Nuclear Power: Why Governing is Easier Said than Done

Abstract

Governance studies have taken an interpretative turn. There is value in this development which emphasises how, through the construction of narrative and meaning, the processes of governance can be given direction. A study of Britain's privatised energy industry, embedded in a complex set of international networks and market conditions, is used to illustrate the argument. Government cannot command an expansion of nuclear power to meet future energy needs but is seeking to deliver it through a governance narrative that is collaborative and decentred. To judge the likely success of this governance stance requires stepping beyond an interpretative frame and complementing it with insights from a historical institutional perspective. The British government is severely hampered in achieving its objectives by institutional and structural constraints.Britain's previous Labour government declared that it would seek to promote the construction of a new generation of nuclear power stations in Britain. Nuclear power was necessary to provide a secure, low-carbon supply of electricity (Department of Trade and Industry [DTI], 2006a; 2007; Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [BERR], 2008). The coalition government elected in 2010 also supports new nuclear builds and this support has remained in place since the 2011 Fukushima accident in Japan (Department of Energy and Climate Change [DECC], 2011a).As Britain has a privatised electricity generation industry, any revival of nuclear power will be delivered through commercial energy companies. These companies are embedded within a complex international network of suppliers and manufacturers. Moreover, nuclear energy suppliers are influenced by market forces in respect of competing sources of energy, the taxation of carbon and the availability of capital finance to fund the building of new nuclear power stations (see Crooks and Pfeifer, 2011;Sokolski, 2011). Therefore, the future of nuclear power in Britain is firmly in the realms of governance as government cannot exercise hierarchical authority but seeks to influence markets, networks of stakeholders and citizens to achieve its ends (see Chhotray and Stoker, 2009;Rhodes, 1997).Studies of governance have taken an interpretative turn which emphasises the role of agency and ideas situated in various discourses to explain how and why government might act (Bang

The role of localism in the development of regional structures in post-war Finland

“…Our approach is rooted in the historical institutional approach to public policy-making (see Amenta and Ramsey, 2010; Baker and Stoker, 2013; Mahoney, 2000). Institutionalists generally explore how institutions are created and how they structure human behaviour.…”

Fragmented Energy Governance and the Provision of Global Public Goods

“…Some authors have proposed that the IEF could provide public goods such as alternative or spare energy infrastructures (Harks, ). There is also the Energy Charter, which has been unable to govern Russian gas exports, but has received a lot of academic attention (Belgi, 2013; Herranz and Natorski, ; Konoplyanik and Wälde, ); and dedicated institutions to deal with nuclear energy global challenges, like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) (Fischer, ; Baker and Stoker, ).…”

“… Abbott, ; Baker and Stoker, ; Carbonnier, ; Cherp et al., ; Dubash and Florini, ; Florini and Sovacool, , ; Goldthau and Witte, , , ; Goldthau and Sovacool, ; Karlsson‐Vinkhuyzen, ; Lesage et al., , ; and Van de Graaf, . …”

Transcending the Institutionalist- Interpretivist Binary: Realizing Critical Realist Theory of Governance as Metagovernance

“…The early governance literature has drew upon institutional theory and behavioralist analysis (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992;Rhodes, 1997;Kjaer, 2004;Chhotray & Stoker, 2009;Peters, 2011b;Baker & Stoker, 2013) which views governance as driven by links between actors and agency in networks. Even now, much of dominant governance insights comes from the new institutionalism 3 which is interested in explaining how networked relationships between government and societal actors affect the policy precess Rothstein, 2014) and investigating the formal and informal rules of the game in a polity (Feeny, 1993;March & Olsen, 1995;Hyden, Court, & Mease, 2004).…”

“…Some of them constructively inquire about whether the interpretative turn abandons the value of the earlier insights from institutionalist traditions and influence of deep, not directly observable, structural influences on policy and action and whether the emphasis on meaning offers an deficient understanding of power relations (McAnulla, 2007;Marsh, 2008;Smith, 2008;Glynos & Howarth, 2008;Peters, 2011b;Baker & Stoker, 2013). It fails to consider the persistence of hierarchy and structurally derived constraints on action in government (Baker & Stoker, 2013). As Bell and Hindmoor (2009) remind us, government is, in fact, influential not because its well storytelling ability but its capability to retain state power and authority over resources and territory.…”