Governance and Institutions: A More Political Commission

Dinan, Desmond

doi:10.1111/jcms.12427

Cited by 36 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Juncker, in turn, can claim a mandate to put into effect the policy programme on which he had campaigned (Becker et al, , p. 1021). While these closer ties with the EP could lead to a more problematic relationship with the Council and the European Council (Dinan, , p. 114), neither of which body proposed Juncker as President, and in fact some Member States, such as the UK, were explicitly opposed, Juncker is nevertheless able to moderate this possible negative effect through his long‐term membership of the European Council before he became Commission President. The most relevant institutional constraints and opportunities for the Commission's leadership within the EU system can be summarized as follows: Constraints: More assertive Council and European Council, more autonomous EP; Opportunities: Divisions in Council, closer ties between Commission and EP due to ‘ Spitzenkandidaten ‐Procedure’. …”

Section: Analytical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…‘While in the past, Commissioners could produce communications on everything and sell them immediately to the public, they are much more controlled now’ (11) and ‘held on a short leash’ (14). ‘Several interviewees reported that this new hierarchy has led to complaints among Commissioners about excessive centralization and control (see also Dinan, , p. 106; Euractiv, ).…”

Section: Leadership In the European Commission: Evidence From Interviewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the interviewees from the Council's SG, the underlying motivation for an increased use of impact assessments was Juncker's effort to strengthen the Commission's influence in the inter‐institutional relationship, rather than a desire to contribute to better law‐making (see also Dinan, , p. 106). Two main reasons were stated in this regard.…”

Section: Inter‐institutional Leadership Of the Commission: Evidence Fmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intra‐ and Inter‐Institutional Leadership of the European Commission President: An Assessment of Juncker's Organizational Reforms

Bürgin

2017

J of Common Market Studies

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By most accounts, the Commission President's potential for political leadership within the EU system has declined since the 1990s, due to the increasingly assertive role of the European Council, and a more autonomous European Parliament (EP). Furthermore, the incumbent's authority over the Commission is complicated by the Commission's internal fragmentation and specialization. Based on interviews with experienced policy‐makers from the Commission, the Council and the EP, this article argues that Juncker's leadership inside the Commission, as well as his leadership within the EU system have been strengthened by his organizational reforms, such as the introduction of project‐team leading Vice‐Presidents and a stronger role of the Secretariat General. These findings challenge the accounts emphasizing the declining leadership capacity of the Commission.

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Section: Analytical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Leadership In the European Commission: Evidence From Interviewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Inter‐institutional Leadership Of the Commission: Evidence Fmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intra‐ and Inter‐Institutional Leadership of the European Commission President: An Assessment of Juncker's Organizational Reforms

Bürgin

2017

J of Common Market Studies

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“…Impact assessments are strongly institutionalised within the Commission, as they are 'required for Commission initiatives that are likely to have significant economic, environmental, or social impacts' (European Commission 2015b). The role of impact assessments within the Commission has recently been strengthened with the replacement of the Impact Assessment Board by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, whose powers and responsibilities have been expanded compared to its predecessor (Dinan 2016).…”

Section: Impact Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is also clear that the primary purpose of the IA is to ensure that EU policy initiatives are commensurate with the perceived scale of a specific problem that needs addressing. In the context of the Better Regulation Agenda and the REFIT platform (the regulatory fitness and performance programme), it is no surprise that IAs are growing in importance within the Commission (Dinan 2016).…”

Section: Impact Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Innovation assessment: governing through periods of disruptive technological change

Hasselbalch

2017

Journal of European Public Policy

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Current regulatory approaches are ill-equipped to address the challenges of governing through periods of disruptive technological change. This article hones in on the use of assessment regimes at the level of the European Union, particularly in the work of the Commission, to argue for a missing middle between technology assessment and impact assessment. Technology assessment focuses on the upstream governance of science and technology, while impact assessment focuses on the downstream governance of the impacts of specific policy options. What is missing is a form of midstream governance, which I label innovation assessment, to steer polities through periods of disruptive technological change, during which innovations have taken concrete forms and are beginning to diffuse, but still exhibit much scope for rapid, unexpected change and alternative trajectories of development. By juxtaposing these three forms of assessment regimes, I define the main dimensions along which they vary.

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Multiple streams, leaked opportunities, and entrepreneurship in the EU agenda against tax avoidance

Roland

2019

European Policy Analysis

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This paper discusses the recent initiatives of the EU against tax evasion and tax avoidance from a Multiple Streams perspective. By combining a chronological review of EU tax provisions with a quantitative content analysis of official EU documents, I show how both EU corporate tax policy and the way it is framed have changed over time: From market-enhancing toward market-regulating tax measures that explicitly address corporate tax avoidance. Contrary to what is often assumed, findings show that the crucial window of opportunity did not stem from the financial and Eurozone crisis, but rather from the accumulation of tax scandals since 2013. Furthermore, my analysis differentiates between the entrepreneurship of the Commission as a whole and the individual entrepreneurship of single personalities to better understand the dynamics that lead to policy change in the EU.

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Governance and Institutions: A More Political Commission

Cited by 36 publications

References 8 publications

Intra‐ and Inter‐Institutional Leadership of the European Commission President: An Assessment of Juncker's Organizational Reforms

Intra‐ and Inter‐Institutional Leadership of the European Commission President: An Assessment of Juncker's Organizational Reforms

Innovation assessment: governing through periods of disruptive technological change

Multiple streams, leaked opportunities, and entrepreneurship in the EU agenda against tax avoidance

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