Gov-Arrrgh-Nance: Jolly Rogers and Dodgy Rulers

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn this paper, we argue that the effect of governance on the emergence of crimes of different levels of sophistication is highly non-linear. State failure, anarchy and a lack of infrastructure are not conducive to establishing any business, including illicit enterprises. At the bottom of the spectrum, therefore, both legal business and criminal gangs benefit from improved governance. With further improvements in governance criminal activities decline. We find strong and consistent support for this hypothesis using the International Maritime Bureau's dataset on piracy. Piracy is reported by ship-owners, giving a unique insight into crime in badly governed countries which were systematically excluded from previous analyses. We show that profitable forms of piracy flourish where on the one hand there is stability and infrastructure, but on the other hand the state does not have the capacity to intervene and/or bureaucrats can be bribed to turn a blind eye. For minor acts of theft from ships the pattern is quadratic: piracy first rises and then falls as governance improves.

Measuring the global impact of destructive and illegal fishing on maritime piracy: A spatial analysis

“…In these settings, criminal networks can further challenge state authority, diminish its revenue-raising ability, and erode its judicial capacity. State fragility and collapse are considered precursors of piracy, due to both the absence of state security forces as well as the possibility that pirates act as quasi-state agents in the absence of maritime enforcement [ 77 – 79 ]. We estimate fragility in terms the number of times that the country appeared on the list of fragile states maintained by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in each five-year period [ 80 ].…”

“…Piracy is expected near areas facing unfavorable economic conditions [ 3 , 31 , 83 – 85 ]. Yet piracy requires functioning markets in which pirates can recruit other members, sell stolen cargo, and acquire financing, weapons, and other equipment needed for forays into territorial and international waters [ 77 , 86 ]. In cells within 3° inland of the coastline, we include indicators of economic activity levels, drought, and population.…”

Global patterns of maritime piracy, 2000–09

“…The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the authoritative legal standard, alternatively defines maritime piracy as any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.... (UN, 1982: Article 101) 6 Following the law, piracy must occur on the high seas and not within a state's territorial waters. If piracy-like attacks occur within any state's jurisdiction, then they 3 Working papers using data similar to the MPD include Daxecker & Prins (2010);de Groot & Shortland (2010); Iyigun & Ratisukpimol (2011); and Jablonski & Oliver (forthcoming). The most comparable, Jablonski & Oliver, uses the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) reports and counts 130 fewer piracy events (3,284) over the same time period.…”

“…The annual data are most appropriate for crossnational country-level studies examining how a state's economic, political, and social conditions influence its propensity towards piracy. For instance, Hastings (2009) and de Groot & Shortland (2010) suggest that state failure creates hospitable conditions for certain types of piracy, but inhospitable conditions for others. And Jablonski & Oliver (forthcoming) and Daxecker & Prins (2011) suggest that global maritime piracy patterns are tied to a country's institutional and macroeconomic conditions.…”

“…2 One such threat is maritime piracy, which is currently regionally concentrated in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea, and is believed to operate in concert with other threats such as terrorism, weapons, and human and drug trafficking (Chalk, 2008;Goldwyn & Morrison, 2005;Mak, 2006;Murphy, 2010). A varied piracy literature already exists (Anderson, 2001;de Groot & Shortland, 2010;Eklöf, 2006;Hansen, 2009;Hastings, 2009;Kontorovich, 2009;Leeson, 2009;Menkhaus, 2009;Middleton, 2009;Young, 2007). However, the wealth of data regarding piracy now available permits greater insights into the phenomenon.…”