Good and Bad Reasoning about COVID-19

Cummings, Louise

doi:10.22329/il.v40i4.6310

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…There may be a presumption for taking one’s word when there are recognized good reasons for it, either given by the source making the assertion or by some other source. In discussing arguments made during the COVID-19 pandemic, Cummings ( 2020 ) points out that some good arguments are by analogy. When first encountering COVID-19, our information about the virus was incomplete.…”

Section: Taking One’s Word—when Is There a Presumption?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These included phylogenetic and immunological similarities between the two viruses sufficient to justify dealing with COVID-19 as with SARS-CoV. They deemed these similarities sufficient to justify expecting further similarities in transmission and incubation periods (Cummings 2020 , 534). There is a pragmatic dimension to this recognition.…”

Section: Taking One’s Word—when Is There a Presumption?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is a pragmatic dimension to this recognition. The alternative of refusing to act on conclusions reached by analogical reasoning “can cost lives and erode trust in public health agencies” ( 2020 , 535). This reasoning is obviously defeasible, but it was not defeated.…”

Section: Taking One’s Word—when Is There a Presumption?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The similarities were straightforwardly recognizable, at least by those familiar with viruses, and no dissimilarities were obvious. As Cummings puts it, “Analogical reasoning was a naturally warranted strategy” ( 2020 , 535).…”

Section: Taking One’s Word—when Is There a Presumption?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Should one give a fallacious argument for one’s word, it will fail to establish a presumption for it. In ( 2020 ), Cummings has reviewed several patterns of fallacious reasoning given in the controversy over dealing properly with COVID-19. We may recognize legitimate exceptions to generalizations or general rules.…”

Section: When Isn’t There a Presumption For Taking One’s Word?mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

The Fallacy of Misplaced Presumption

Freeman

2023

Argumentation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One takes one’s word that p when a source vouches for p and one accepts the word of that source. If the source is reliable in this case, p is acceptable. The reliability of the source is a measure of its plausibility. If a source has the relevant competence, credibility, authority, that word is acceptable. Likewise, the word may be acceptable if accompanied by a cogent argument, but presumption may be misplaced. One may recognize a presumption for a statement when such recognition is not justified, the positive version of the fallacy. One may refuse to recognize a presumption for a statement when there really is a presumption for the statement, the negative version of the fallacy. The essay proceeds to explore various dimensions of when it is justified to take a source’s word for a claim, and when it is justified to reject a claim from a source. The discussion ranges over considerations of sexism and race, cultural differences, and the relationship of presumptions to fallacies. Also considered is the role of trust in taking someone’s word and the factors involved in trusting someone.

show abstract

Section: Taking One’s Word—when Is There a Presumption?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Taking One’s Word—when Is There a Presumption?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Taking One’s Word—when Is There a Presumption?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Taking One’s Word—when Is There a Presumption?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: When Isn’t There a Presumption For Taking One’s Word?mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The Fallacy of Misplaced Presumption

Freeman

2023

Argumentation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

On Arguments from Ignorance in Policy-Making

Andone

Hernández

2022

The Pandemic of Argumentation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract“Schools should remain open during the COVID-19 pandemic, because there is no evidence indicating that children can get the virus.” Many European policy-makers have employed such arguments from ignorance to argue for a course of action in a situation in which science lacked vital information. What is particularly challenging about such arguments is that, despite the ignorance involved, they are used to justify policies meant to deal with practical problems. Limited information (‘there is no evidence indicating that children can get the virus’) is used as a basis for decision-making that might have significant consequences for the population (‘schools should remain open’). This chapter explains the intricate but unavoidable relationship between arguments from ignorance and policy-making. Moreover, evaluation criteria are developed to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable arguments from ignorance in policy-making by taking into consideration the structure of these argument types and their contexts of application. Finally, the chapter assesses two real-life instances of arguments from ignorance employed by the European Commission and the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such an assessment sets important steps in understanding how arguments from ignorance can facilitate or reduce acceptance of the measures proposed by policy-makers.

show abstract

Protecting the Public's Health during Novel Infectious Disease Outbreaks

Cummings

2024

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This Element examines two prominent public health crises – the emergence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in British cattle and the COVID-19 pandemic. It contends that a group of arguments called the informal fallacies functioned as cognitive heuristics and facilitated public health reasoning during both crises. These arguments, which include the argument from ignorance, the argument from authority, and circular argument, are particularly well adapted to the type of uncertainty that surrounds the emergence of novel infectious diseases. By bridging gaps in knowledge, these arguments can facilitate reasoning when evidence about these diseases is limited and the need to take action is urgent. The Element charts a public health journey beginning in the 1950s with a disease called kuru, then examines the response to the emergence of BSE in 1986 and extends to the present day with the COVID-19 pandemic. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

show abstract

Good and Bad Reasoning about COVID-19

Cited by 7 publications

References 22 publications

The Fallacy of Misplaced Presumption

The Fallacy of Misplaced Presumption

On Arguments from Ignorance in Policy-Making

Protecting the Public's Health during Novel Infectious Disease Outbreaks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About