Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power

Sechser, Todd S.

doi:10.1017/s0020818310000214

Cited by 104 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 53 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…See Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1988;Nalebuff 1991;and Sechser 2010. the other hand, they cannot predict precisely the point at which the defender will move from acquiescing to ever-more stringent demands to preferring to fight. Challengers thus face a risk-return tradeoff, in which higher demands increase the probability of war, but also increase the benefits associated with peace should the defender acquiesce.…”

Section: Reputation Proponentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics

Weisiger¹,

Yarhi-Milo²

2015

Int Org

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Policy-makers and political scientists have long believed that states must make policy with an eye to maintaining a good reputation, especially a good reputation for resolve. Recent work, however, has argued that reputations for resolve do not form, and hence that past actions do not influence observers' behavior in subsequent interactions. This conclusion is theoretically problematic and unsupported by the evidence offered by reputation critics. In particular, juxtaposing reputation for resolve to power and interests is misleading when past actions influence observers' beliefs about interests, while the common approach of looking at crisis decision making misses the impact of reputation on general deterrence. We thus derive hypotheses about conflict onset from both the arguments of reputation critics and the logic of more standard reputation arguments, which we put to statistical test. We find that past action is closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation and that the effects of reputation generalize beyond the immediate circumstances of the past dispute. Although reputation is not all-important, leaders are well advised to consider the reputational implications of policy decisions in international conflict.Leaders often claim that a reputation for resolve is worth fighting for. President Harry Truman justified intervention in Korea on the grounds that a failure to respond "would be an open invitation to new acts of aggression elsewhere." 1 Justifying a firm policy by invoking concerns for the country's reputation may serve as an effective rhetorical tool to garner the public's support. But are leaders right to be concerned about their country's reputation for resolve? Does having a good or a bad reputation for resolve matter in international politics?Both policy-makers and international relations scholars traditionally have answered both these questions in the affirmative. However, drawing on a surprising dearth of evidence of reputation in the historical record, a growing literature argues both theoretically and empirically that states do not in fact develop reputations for resolution or irresolution. This conclusion suggests that leaders' efforts to build and protect those reputations have been wasted.

show abstract

Section: Reputation Proponentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics

Weisiger¹,

Yarhi-Milo²

2015

Int Org

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…It has been suggested that the reputational costs involved in submitting to foreign pressures are key to understanding why coercive threats by stronger states can fail to achieve their objectives over weaker states (Sescher 2010).…”

Section: Policy Transfer National Reputation and Hypocrisy Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Hypocrisy Matter? National Reputational Damage and British Anti-Corruption Mentoring in the Balkans

Xenakis

Ivanov

2016

Crit Crim

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:In the late 2000s, numerous prominent public commentators raised concerns that corruption scandals were harming Britain's ability to play a leadership role in anticorruption initiatives abroad. With a view to contributing to critical criminological scholarship on international policy transfer and double standards in criminal justice policy and practice, this article explores the extent to which reputational damage curtailed Britain's appeal as an anti-corruption mentor in South-East Europe during the 2000s.Challenging the common presumption that stronger states tarnished by corruption scandals will face 'hypocricy costs' abroad, this article finds that a range of factors work to insulate stronger states from the potential ramifications of reputational decline.

show abstract

“…Sartori 2005;Sechser 2010). If analyzed from the perspective of the policy makers for whom retaining office is an important if not paramount concern, the domestic political consequences of international crises are extremely pertinent (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).…”

Section: Audience Costs and Crisis Bargaining: Theory And Testsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy

Haynes

2012

Journal of Conflict Resolution

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The literature on ''audience costs'' in International Relations suggests that a democratic leader's electoral accountability lends him or her a significant advantage in crisis-bargaining situations. But if elections are the primary source of a democratic leader's accountability, a democracy's advantage in crisis situations should disappear when its leader is no longer eligible for reelection. Accordingly, this article asks whether ''lame-duck'' presidents, those who are constitutionally prohibited from reelection, are systematically less effective than their reelectable counterparts in crisis-bargaining situations. Using a data set of all post-World War II militarized interstate disputes initiated by presidential democracies, the author tests several hypotheses regarding lame-duck crisis behavior derived from Fearon's bargaining model. The findings generally support the audience costs model. Observed patterns of threat reciprocation and crisis hostility are consistent with Fearon's predictions. Crisis outcomes, however, do not appear to be affected by a democratic leader's lame-duck status.

show abstract

Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power

Cited by 104 publications

References 53 publications

Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics

Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics

Does Hypocrisy Matter? National Reputational Damage and British Anti-Corruption Mentoring in the Balkans

Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About