Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014

Funke, Michael; Schularick, Moritz; Trebesch, Christoph

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.03.006

Cited by 385 publications

(215 citation statements)

References 59 publications

(63 reference statements)

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“…Yet the stress of the country‐level literature has been precisely on the links between economic shocks and support for far‐right movements. Funke et al () studied the link between the incidence of financial crises and support for political extremism across 20 advanced countries, from 1874 onwards. The authors found that the presence of a financial crisis led to an average increase of the vote share for the far right of 30 per cent within five years after the onset of the crisis.…”

Section: Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The wisdom of demagogues: institutions, corruption and support for authoritarian populists

Roháč¹,

Kumar²,

Heinö³

2017

Economic Affairs

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This article analyses the drivers of support for authoritarian populist parties in Europe. Such parties claim to represent the interests of ordinary people against greedy and out‐of‐touch elites. Simultaneously, they reject conventional constraints on democratic policymaking. In recent years, such parties on the political left and right have been gaining influence in countries across Europe. Using a panel data set from 1980–2016, we use semiparametric Tobit models with country fixed effects to explain support for authoritarian populists. We find that large vote shares of right‐wing – but not left‐wing – authoritarian populists are associated closely to corruption. Other commonly cited explanations such as unemployment, inequality and immigration perform poorly in predicting support for populist political platforms on the political right. While a full theoretical explanation of the link between corruption and right‐wing populism remains beyond the scope of this article, we suggest that the mechanism involves political trust. Corruption weakens trust in political institutions, which populists exploit. Curbing the rise of right‐wing authoritarian populism in Europe will thus require restoring trust in the integrity of politics.

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Section: Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The wisdom of demagogues: institutions, corruption and support for authoritarian populists

Roháč¹,

Kumar²,

Heinö³

2017

Economic Affairs

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“…It is conceivable within out model that western democracies have seen the unfolding of a slow but steady long-term acceleration of opinion dynamics, with the passing of the threshold of 7-15 months contributing to the recent emergence of political styles disrupting political conventions considered hitherto as fundamental [20]. External effects, such as the 2007-08 financial crisis [31,32], would induce in this view an additional temporary but sharp rise in β.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entrenched time delays versus accelerating opinion dynamics: are advanced democracies inherently unstable?

Gros

2017

Eur. Phys. J. B

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Abstract. Modern societies face the challenge that the time scale of opinion formation is continuously accelerating in contrast to the time scale of political decision making. With the latter remaining of the order of the election cycle we examine here the case that the political state of a society is determined by the continuously evolving values of the electorate. Given this assumption we show that the time lags inherent in the election cycle will inevitable lead to political instabilities for advanced democracies characterized both by an accelerating pace of opinion dynamics and by high sensibilities (political correctness) to deviations from mainstream values. Our result is based on the observation that dynamical systems become generically unstable whenever time delays become comparable to the time it takes to adapt to the steady state. The time needed to recover from external shocks grows in addition dramatically close to the transition. Our estimates for the order of magnitude of the involved time scales indicate that socio-political instabilities may develop once the aggregate time scale for the evolution of the political values of the electorate falls below 7-15 months.

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“…Die deutsche Wirtschaftsordnung nach Eucken (1952) Funke et al (2015). Durchschnittlicher europäischer Geldmarkzins bis 2013.…”

Section: Das Versagen Der Einheitlichen Geldpolitik Im Heterogenen Wäunclassified

Zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union aus ordnungspolitischer Perspektive

Schnabl¹,

Müller²

2017

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Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014

Cited by 385 publications

References 59 publications

The wisdom of demagogues: institutions, corruption and support for authoritarian populists

The wisdom of demagogues: institutions, corruption and support for authoritarian populists

Entrenched time delays versus accelerating opinion dynamics: are advanced democracies inherently unstable?

Zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union aus ordnungspolitischer Perspektive

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