God, the Divine, and Nov∑ in Relation to the De Anima

Macfarlane, Patrick; Polansky, Ronald

doi:10.2307/j.ctt9qdwr7.10

Cited by 3 publications

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“…Also, Franz Brentano (1911bBrentano ( /1978, whom I consider to be one of the most important Aristotelian scholars (despite his interpretation being far from flawless), believes that there is a specific function and he calls it "moving our thoughts from potentiality to actuality". There are also intermediate positions, according to which nous poietikos is just our knowledge that allows us to think the things that we know (Macfarlane, Polansky, 2009) rather loosely inspired by Arabic Aristotelianism (Averroes).…”

Section: Carry On Regardlessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rational vs. Mystical Readings of Aristotle’s Nous Poietikos Introduction to the Subject and Overview of Central Positions

Kamińska

2017

Analiza I Egzystencja

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Section: Carry On Regardlessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rational vs. Mystical Readings of Aristotle’s Nous Poietikos Introduction to the Subject and Overview of Central Positions

Kamińska

2017

Analiza I Egzystencja

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Aristotle on the Daemonic in De divinatione

Radovic

2024

Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie

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I argue that the adjective δαιμόνιος (‘daemonic’) and the substantivized adjective τὸ δαιμόνιον (‘the daemonic’) that occur in Aristotle’s dream treatises basically mean ‘divine-like,’ denoting an illusory appearance of divine intervention, typically in the form of an alleged god-sent prophetic dream. Yet the appearances to which the terms refer are, in fact, neither divine nor supernatural at all, but involve merely coincidental correlations between the dream and the fulfilling event. It is shown that Aristotle’s use of ‘daemonic’ is traditional and reflects the endoxon that prophetic dreams are closely related to the divine. The paper also examines a set of earlier readings of the daemonic in De divinatione in relation to the proposed interpretation.

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Avicennian reсeption of Aristotle’s philosophical psychology: the definition of the soul

Ефремова

2021

Orientalistica

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In the encyclopedic treatise, the ash-Shifā’ (“The Healing”), the most prominent philosopher of classical Islam Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (980–1037) has substantially revised the Aristotelian teaching about the soul. In the first instance, this revision is evident in terms of orientation to a strictly apodictic epistemology and to a synthesis of the Aristotelian teaching with Islamic monotheism. Following this second trend, Ibn Sina supplies the psychology with new dimensions – cosmological, angelological, prophetological and eschatological (more precisely, soteriological). The first book of the “Psychology” (an-Nafs) mainly deals with the notion of the soul. Ibn Sina comments on the traditional peripatetic definition of the soul with relation to the doctrine of the souls of the celestial spheres. In this context is highlighted the operational rather than the essential nature of this qualification and is also given its other modification. While analyzing the three classical characteristics of the soul (i.e. “potency”, “form” and “entelechy” – the realization of potentia), the philosopher justifies the “entelechy” as the most adequate term for it.

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God, the Divine, and Nov∑ in Relation to the De Anima

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Rational vs. Mystical Readings of Aristotle’s Nous Poietikos Introduction to the Subject and Overview of Central Positions

Rational vs. Mystical Readings of Aristotle’s Nous Poietikos Introduction to the Subject and Overview of Central Positions

Aristotle on the Daemonic in De divinatione

Avicennian reсeption of Aristotle’s philosophical psychology: the definition of the soul

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