2021
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197556412.001.0001
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God, Suffering, and the Value of Free Will

Abstract: This book focuses on arguments from suffering against the existence of God and on a variety of issues concerning agency and value that they bring out. The central aim is to show the extent and power of arguments from evil. The book provides a close investigation of an under-defended claim at the heart of the major free-will-based responses to such arguments, namely that free will is sufficiently valuable to serve as the good, or to serve prominently among the goods, that provides a God-justifying reason for pe… Show more

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Cited by 17 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Assumptions provide another threat to the validity of data collection. Assumptions are defined as any influences the researcher has on any unexamined beliefs that we think without realizing it (Ekstrom, 2021). To eliminate both limitations and assumptions, delimitations are set in place to create boundaries for the research process.…”
Section: Limitations and Assumptionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Assumptions provide another threat to the validity of data collection. Assumptions are defined as any influences the researcher has on any unexamined beliefs that we think without realizing it (Ekstrom, 2021). To eliminate both limitations and assumptions, delimitations are set in place to create boundaries for the research process.…”
Section: Limitations and Assumptionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For challenges to the justifying power of freedom, seeLewis (1993),Schellenberg (2004),Himma (2009),Schlossberger (2015),Sterba (2019), andEkstrom (2021).19 SeePittard (2018, 92) for the related suggestion that what justifies God's permission of pointless evils is our having difference-making responsibility, where (e.g.) "for Lola to have difference-making responsibility for averting E, it must be the case that had she chosen B, E would have occurred" (my emphasis).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For versions of the free will defense that avoid reliance on transworld depravity, see Otte (2009) and Pruss (2012) 9 For critical discussions of Plantinga's argument for P 3 , see DeRose (1991), Howard-Snyder andO'Leary-Hawthorne (1998), Otte (2009), Pruss (2012), andMeslar (2015). For critical discussions of P 2 , see Himma (2009) and Ekstrom (2021). For the suggestion that no one would be free if both Molinism and libertarianism were true-thus undermining any free will defense that presupposes both-see Climenhaga and Rubio (2022).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%