Goal Setting as a Self-Regulation Mechanism

Suvorov, Anton; Ven, Jeroen van de

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1286029

“…In Hsiaw (2009), this implies that the individual cannot actively choose his goal—an important ingredient of our model. Suvorov and van de Ven (2008) interpret goals as past expectations regarding future effort, in the spirit of Köszegi and Rabin (2006). In this framework, goals can be stochastic, and bounds on goal setting arise because the individual can only choose among those reference points that are consistent with one of the multiple personal equilibria .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self‐regulation through Goal Setting*

Koch¹,

Nafziger²

2011

Scandinavian J Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Self-Regulation through Goal Setting *Goals are an important source of motivation. But little is known about why and how people set them. We address these questions in a model based on two stylized facts from psychology and behavioral economics: i) Goals serve as reference points for performance. ii) Present-biased preferences create self-control problems. We show how goals permit selfregulation, but also that they are painful self-disciplining devices. Greater self-control problems therefore lead to stronger self-regulation through goals only up to a certain point. For severely present-biased preferences, the required goal for self-regulation is too painful and the individual rather gives up. JEL Classification:A12, C70, D91

show abstract

“…However, too much reference dependence can itself be a source of intrapersonal conflict, causing an agent to wait longer than the first best. Suvorov and van de Ven (2008) and Koch and Nafziger (2011) study a three-period problem where a sophisticated agent sets a goal regarding both current effort and delayed task benefit, while Koch, Nafziger, Suvorov and van de Ven (2014) extend the goal-setting framework to contingent self-rewards. Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) develop a model of reference dependent preferences in which an individual derives utility from both final outcomes and comparison to a reference point endogenously determined by rational expectations, and extend it to a dynamic setting (Kőszegi and Rabin 2009).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Goal bracketing and self-control

Hsiaw

¹

2018

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies the role of goal bracketing to attenuate time inconsistency. When setting non-binding goals in multi-stage project, an agent must also decide how and when to evaluate himself against such goals. In particular, he can bracket broadly by setting an aggregate goal for the entire project, or narrowly by setting incremental goals for individual stages. In the presence of loss aversion and uncertainty over outcomes, this decision involves a trade-off between motivation and comparative disutility due to ex-ante uncertainty. Narrow goal bracketing can be used as an instrument to counteract the self-control problem, while broad goal bracketing can itself generate apparently erroneous behavior such as the sunk cost fallacy. The sequential nature of decision-making introduces a differential reaction to outcome uncertainty based on its timing, which determines the optimal bracketing choice. * I thank my adviser, Roland Bénabou, for guidance and encouragement. I also thank

show abstract

“…However, too much reference dependence can itself be a source of intrapersonal conflict, causing an agent to wait longer than the first best. Suvorov and van de Ven (2008) and Koch and Nafziger (2011) study a three-period problem where a sophisticated agent sets a goal regarding both current effort and delayed task benefit, while Koch, Nafziger, Suvorov and van de Ven (2014) extend the goal-setting framework to contingent self-rewards. Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) develop a model of reference dependent preferences in which an individual derives utility from both final outcomes and comparison to a reference point endogenously determined by rational expectations, and extend it to a dynamic setting (Kőszegi and Rabin 2009).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Goal Bracketing and Self-Control

Hsiaw

¹

2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies the role of goal bracketing to attenuate time inconsistency. When setting non-binding goals in multi-stage project, an agent must also decide how and when to evaluate himself against such goals. In particular, he can bracket broadly by setting an aggregate goal for the entire project, or narrowly by setting incremental goals for individual stages. In the presence of loss aversion and uncertainty over outcomes, this decision involves a trade-off between motivation and comparative disutility due to ex-ante uncertainty. Narrow goal bracketing can be used as an instrument to counteract the self-control problem, while broad goal bracketing can itself generate apparently erroneous behavior such as the sunk cost fallacy. The sequential nature of decision-making introduces a differential reaction to outcome uncertainty based on its timing, which determines the optimal bracketing choice.

show abstract

Goal Setting as a Self-Regulation Mechanism

Cited by 20 publications

References 44 publications

Self‐regulation through Goal Setting*

Self‐regulation through Goal Setting*

Goal bracketing and self-control

Goal Bracketing and Self-Control

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About