GNSS spoofing detection via opportunistic IRIDIUM signals

Abstract

In this paper, we study the privately-own IRIDIUM satellite constellation, to provide a location service that is independent of the GNSS. In particular, we apply our findings to propose a new GNSS spoofing detection solution, exploiting unencrypted IRIDIUM Ring Alert (IRA) messages that are broadcast by IRIDIUM satellites.To achieve the above-introduced objective, we firstly reverseengineer many parameters of the IRIDIUM satellite constellation, such as the satellites speed, packet interarrival times, maximum satellite coverage, satellite pass duration, and the satellite beam constellation, to name a few. Later, we adopt the aforementioned statistics to create a detailed model of the satellite network. Subsequently, we propose a solution to detect unintended deviations of a target user from his path, due to GNSS spoofing attacks. We show that our solution can be used efficiently and effectively to verify the position estimated from standard GNSS satellite constellation, and we provide constraints and parameters to fit several application scenarios. All the results reported in this paper, while showing the quality and viability of our proposal, are supported by real data. In particular, we have collected and analyzed hundreds of thousands of IRA messages, thanks to a measurement campaign lasting several days. All the collected data (1000+ hours) have been made available to the research community.Our solution is particularly suitable for unattended scenarios such as deserts, rural areas, or open seas, where standard spoofing detection techniques resorting to crowd-sourcing cannot be used due to deployment limitations. Moreover, contrary to competing solutions, our approach does not resort to physical-layer information, dedicated hardware, or multiple receiving stations, while exploiting only a single receiving antenna and publicly-available IRIDIUM transmissions. Finally, novel research directions are also highlighted. CCS CONCEPTS• Security and privacy → Mobile and wireless security; Software reverse engineering.

Cyber Security in the Maritime Industry: A Systematic Survey of Recent Advances and Future Trends

“…Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS): GPS (US), GLONASS (Russia), Galileo (EU) and BeiDou (China) all fall under the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) umbrella. Cyber attacks on GNSS have been-facilitated by the lack of authentication and encryption-rendering the system vulnerable to breaches [134,135]. Fake position information significantly increases the probability of collisions, and the most striking exemplars occur in the Black Sea.…”

“…The highest levels of protection of location data are mandatory for the successful operation of a fleet of autonomous vessels. Therefore, a significant body of research on GNSS spoofing attack detection has been undertaken [134,[136][137][138].…”

Trust the Crowd: Wireless Witnessing to Detect Attacks on ADS-B-Based Air-Traffic Surveillance

“…First results based on cross-referencing within a distributed sensor network are illustrated by Strohmeier et al [50]. Oligeri et al [27] use IRIDIUM signals to validate GNSS position solutions. While Wesson et al [57] discuss solutions based on cryptography, Kim et al [21] evaluate a solution based on protocol extension with timestamps.…”

Orbit-based authentication using TDOA signatures in satellite networks

“…Satellite communications systems such as GPS and parts of Iridium are known to have security issues, most prominently being vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Various analyses [23,26] and some countermeasures [17,18] to those attacks were introduced.…”

“…With their system an accuracy between 80% and 100% was possible, depending on the underlying assumptions. In another recent work of Oligeri et al [18], the authors used unencrypted Iridium Ring Alert messages to verify their own position. Based on this independent verification, the detection of GNSS spoofing was possible.…”