GNSS Spoofing Detection Technique Using Fraction Parts of Double-difference Carrier Phases

Abstract

With electronic warfare increasingly complicated and military confrontations increasingly intense, the potential security threat to satellite navigation has become a difficult issue to deal with. Traditional satellite navigation anti-interference technology generally refers to jamming, but less consideration has been given to spoofing. It should be noted that the potential risk induced by spoofing interference is worse than that caused by jamming as the loss of positioning integrity may not be immediately obvious. This paper introduces a spoofing detection method based on a two-antenna structure using fraction parts of double-difference carrier phase observables. If all spoofing signals are transmitted by one single antenna, a spoofing detection hypothesis test can be carried out through the normalisation of double-difference carrier phase observables, without need to consider the integer ambiguity problem, measure the baseline vector and estimate the real directions of signals. The detection scheme adopts an M of N algorithm (if M or more of the test values exceed the threshold, the algorithm declares the presence of a spoofing signal), integrating carrier phase measurements of all the available satellites. Finally, the proposed method is verified by real experiments. This spoofing detection method can easily be applied to GNSS anti-spoofing receivers without changing their architecture and has simple and effective characteristics.

Navigational Use of the E-Loran System in Modification With the Spline Functions Method

“…При помощи незаконного применения специальных средств можно организовать так называемые инновационные спуфинг-атаки, которые искусственно вызывают искажения реальных данных Global Navigation Satellite System (GNNS) [23], [24]. Спуфинг-технология основана на модуляции псевдослучайного кода на частотах GNNS с переориентированием судового приемоиндикатора от слабого спутникового сигнала на фальсифицированный сильный сигнал [25], [26]. Так, инициативная группа научных исследователей провела уникальный научный эксперимент в Ионическом море в 2013 г. по оценке воздействия спуфинг-атаки на кибернетическую безопасность морского объекта.…”

Satellite-Based Communications Security: A Survey of Threats, Solutions, and Research Challenges

“…A large variety of means have been used to detect GNSS spoofing attacks. Approaches use either PHY-layer information ( [53], [58]- [61], [64], [65], [67]- [70], [73], [74], [76]- [79], [82], [84]), or additional communication technologies ( [26], [56], [57], [62], [63], [66]), or techniques based on Machine Learning (ML) over heterogeneous data ( [75]- [79], [83], [84]). All these techniques share the basic consideration that the bitstrings in GNSS signals cannot be modified to be more secure before being transmitted.…”

“…Comparing the correlation of the received signals using more than one antenna at the receiver side will result in a significant difference in signal characteristics, such as the carrier phase and amplitude. This is just an example of a technique employing multiple receiving antennas to detect GNSS spoofing, and other examples include the contributions by the authors in [53], [59], [61], [62], [64], [65], [70]. Although being relatively cheap to deploy, such solutions usually require the deployment of multiple antennas and their connection to a single system, i.e., the hardware modification of the receiving device.…”

“…Many solutions have been proposed in the last years, recurring to dedicated hardware to detect GNSS spoofing attacks. Such approaches leverage either specific information available from the radio channel ( [58]- [61], [64], [65], [67]- [70], [74], [76]- [78], [82]), or specific type of arrays of antennas, or the use of dedicated sensors providing inertial measurements [80]. Similarly to previous approaches using multiple antennas, such techniques might be very efficient.…”

An Innovative High-Precision Scheme for a GPS/MEMS-SINS Ultra-Tight Integrated System

“…The GPS receiver uses a pseudo-range for positioning in ordinary conditions; the horizontal position error is about 10 m, the vertical position error is about 15 m, and the velocity error is about 0.2 m/s [9]. With the requirement for increased navigation accuracy, carrier phase measurements h been generally accepted in the microelectromechanical system [10]. Lee presented an effective carrier-smoothed-code filter for kinematic differential positioning [11].…”