GNSS Spoofing Detection and Identification Based on Clock Drift Monitoring Using Only One Signal

Shang, Shunshun; Li, Hong; Wei, Yimin; Lu, Mingquan

doi:10.33012/2020.17147

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Therefore, to increase the probability of spoofing detection, it can be recommended to use as large antenna baselines as possible. At the same time, even with the baseline length at the GPS L1 wavelength level (Figure 7), it is still possible to reasonably choose the threshold for criterion (15). Finally, it can be argued that the probability of spoofing detection does not practically depend on the accuracy of the SINS (the moving average remains at 0.15 m for both the low-grade and navigation-grade SINSs in Figures 9 and 10), at least for the selected time interval.…”

Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Global Navigation Satellite System Spoofing Detection in Inertial Satellite Navigation Systems

Zharkov,

Veremeenko,

Kuznetsov

et al. 2023

Inventions

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The susceptibility of global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) to interference significantly limits the possibility of their use. From the standpoint of possible consequences, the most dangerous interference is the so-called spoofing. Simultaneously, in most cases of GNSS use, an inertial navigation system (INS) or an attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) is also present on the board of mobile objects. In this regard, the research goal is to assess the possibility of detecting GNSS spoofing in inertial satellite navigation systems. This paper examines the method for detecting GNSS spoofing by combining a pair of commercially available GNSS receivers and antennas with an INS or AHRS. The method is based on a comparison of the double differences of GNSS carrier phase measurements performed by receivers under conditions of resolved integer ambiguity and the values of the range double differences predicted using an INS. GNSS carrier phase integer ambiguity can be resolved using a strapdown inertial navigation system (SINS) or AHRS data. The mathematical model of GNSS phase difference measurements and the SINS-predicted satellite range differences model are given. The proposed algorithm calculates the moving average of the residuals between the SINS-predicted satellite range double differences and the measured GNSS carrier phase double differences. The primary criterion for spoofing detection is the specified threshold excess of the moving average of the double difference residuals. Experimental studies are performed using simulation and hardware-in-the-loop simulation. The experimental results allow us to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed approach and estimate the potential characteristics of the spoofing detection algorithm based on it.

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Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A variety of approaches are used to detect GNSS spoofing. For example, spoofing detection based on clock bias or drift monitoring is described in [15,16]. A fundamentally different method based on abnormal energy in quadrature (Q) channel correlators is proposed in [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Global Navigation Satellite System Spoofing Detection in Inertial Satellite Navigation Systems

Zharkov,

Veremeenko,

Kuznetsov

et al. 2023

Inventions

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“…In [21], a technique based on repeated measurements of a single GNSS signal is presented, identifying spoofing signals based on the characteristic clock drift of the adversarial transmitter. The proposed countermeasure requires that the legitimate receiver is equipped with a low drift clock, e.g., an atomic clock or an oven compensated oscillator.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result, it cannot safeguard static receivers. Additionally, [16] and [21] require access to low level signal properties that often are not available in consumer grade receivers.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

High-precision Hardware Oscillators Ensemble for GNSS Attack Detection

Spanghero,

Papadimitratos

2022

Preprint

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A wide gamut of important applications rely on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for precise time and positioning. Attackers dictating the GNSS receiver position and time solution are a significant risk, especially due to the inherent vulnerability of GNSS systems. A first line of defense, for a large number of receivers, is to rely on additional information obtained through the rich connectivity of GNSS enabled platforms. Network time can be used for direct validation of the GNSS receiver time; but this depends on network availability. To allow attack detection even when there are prolonged network disconnections, we present a method based on on-board ensemble of reference clocks. This allows the receiver to detect sophisticated attacks affecting the GNSS time solution, independently of the specific attack methodology. Results obtained with Chip-Scale Oven Compensated Oscillators (CS-OCXO) are promising and demonstrate the potential of embedded ensembles of reference clocks, detecting attacks causing modifications of the receiver time offset as low as 0.3 µs, with half the detection latency compared to related literature.

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High-precision Hardware Oscillators Ensemble for GNSS Attack Detection

Spanghero

Papadimitratos

2022

2022 IEEE Aerospace Conference (AERO)

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GNSS Spoofing Detection and Identification Based on Clock Drift Monitoring Using Only One Signal

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Global Navigation Satellite System Spoofing Detection in Inertial Satellite Navigation Systems

Global Navigation Satellite System Spoofing Detection in Inertial Satellite Navigation Systems

High-precision Hardware Oscillators Ensemble for GNSS Attack Detection

High-precision Hardware Oscillators Ensemble for GNSS Attack Detection

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