Gnostic Disagreement Norms

Abstract

Our main question in this paper is as follow: (Q) What are the epistemic norms governing our responses in the face of disagreement? In order to answer it, we begin with some clarification. First, following McHugh (2012), if we employ a useful distinction in normativity theory between evaluative and prescriptive norms, there are two readings of (Q)––we explore such distinction in section 2. And secondly, we accept gnosticism, that is, the account that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It is with this assumption that we want to answer (Q). So, if gnosticism is true, what is the plausible answer to (Q)? In section 3 we argue for gnostic disagreement norms as response to (Q) and in section 4 we apply such norms to particular cases of disagreement.

Fundacionalismo

“…Nessa base, pode-se alegar que as vítimas do génio maligno têm crenças justificadas caso tais vítimas usem as mesmas capacidades normalmente funcionais de formação de crenças. A nossa resposta a este problema, defendida em Faria (2022), também se enquadra nesta primeira categoria, pois argumentamos que as crenças das vítimas do génio maligno estão justificadas na medida em que tais vítimas exibem disposições, na formação ou retenção de tais crenças, que tendem a manifestar estados epistémicos de qualidade (como conhecimento) em casos contrafactuais normais. 31 Por sua vez, na segunda categoria encontram-se as respostas que negam que as vítimas do génio maligno têm crenças justificadas.…”

The Problem of Religious Diversity or Disagreement

“…We don't think so because even if we grant that Greco's account of testimony is plausible, 7 the problem of religious diversity is not entirely solved. The criticism can be summarized in two ways: On the one hand, there are new accounts about how to deal with disagreement, such as Hawthorne andSrinivasan (2013), Broncano-Berrocal andSimion (2021), Faria (2022), that are independent of the concept of 'peer' and do not even use such a concept. Rather than focusing on idealized cases of disagreement among peers, these theories focus on real or everyday disagreements simpliciter and the epistemic norms governing our responses in the face of disagreement.…”