Globalizing Regulation: Reaching Beyond the Borders of Chemical Safety

Abstract

This article argues that although globalization can benefit both exporters and importers of regulation in absolute terms, it may turn the globalization of regulation into a game with relative winners and losers. Using the EU REACH Regulation of chemicals as a case study, it explores the normative, social, economic, and strategic reasons that push the EU to promote the global adoption of REACH. Notwithstanding its attractions, rules globalization may result in a mismatch between global norms and local priorities, particularly for developing countries. It reduces regulatory diversity, and amplifies the strengths but equally the weaknesses of the dominant regulatory framework. While it can foster international trade through mutual recognition of regulatory decisions and the development of transnational regulatory frameworks, it increases the likelihood of conflict and trade flow desequilibria. The article calls for further careful consideration of rules globalization, so that harmonization does not come at the expense of local interests and values.

Legitimacy and the Competition for Regulatory Share

“…Heyvaert argues that this drive to export the regulatory regime has a number of motivations. 67 First, there is a pragmatic motivation, pushed by industry, that others should 'share the pain'. In other words, exporting the regulatory regime and promoting transnational convergence on its terms will ensure that any competitive disadvantage that the regulation imposes on firms is not confined to those in the EU, thus eliminating the EU's competitive disadvantage in this respect.…”

Policy convergence between Korea and the European Union in the field of chemical controls

“…While Holzinger and Knill (2005) and Busch and Jörgens (2005) share some common mechanisms of policy convergence such as imposition, harmonization, and emulation, Drezner (2005), Heyvaert (2009), and Lenschow et al (2005) agree with Holzinger and Knill (2005) in proposing regulatory competition or competitiveness as another cause of policy convergence. Drezner (2005) argues that market size becomes a main driver for other countries to adopt great powers' policies.…”

“…Furthermore, he argues that agreements or disagreements on certain policies produce either effective policy harmonization or partial policy convergence through competition (Drezner 2005). Heyvaert (2009) also articulates competitiveness as a cause of policy convergence since Bthe quest for a level playing field for competition^justifies adopting other countries' policies or product standards (Heyvaert 2009, 114). By taking the EU's REACH as an example, Heyvaert (2009) argues that there are normative, social, economic, and strategic reasons for exporting rules (or policies) at the global level.…”

“…Heyvaert (2009) also articulates competitiveness as a cause of policy convergence since Bthe quest for a level playing field for competition^justifies adopting other countries' policies or product standards (Heyvaert 2009, 114). By taking the EU's REACH as an example, Heyvaert (2009) argues that there are normative, social, economic, and strategic reasons for exporting rules (or policies) at the global level. She explains that the countries that export rules believe their rules are superior for innovation and competitiveness as well as providing higher standards.…”

Environmental governance of pesticides in Ethiopian vegetable and cut flower production

“…Efforts to restrict the use of certain pesticides and promote alternative crop protection methods gained momentum only after the publication of Silent Spring by Rachel Carson in 1962 and the resulting increase in people's awareness of the negative effects of pesticides (Karlsson, 2004(Karlsson, , 2007Heyvaert, 2009). Pesticide policies were developed in many countries with the crucial aim of addressing recognized problems or weaknesses in pesticide registration, distribution and use, or to prevent potential problems from occurring .…”