Globalization and competition: why some emergent countries succeed while others fall behind

doi:10.5860/choice.47-6984

Cited by 10 publications

References 68 publications

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Brazil’s Macroeconomic Policy Institutions, Quasi-Stagnation, and the Interest Rate–Exchange Rate Trap

Bresser-Perreira

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

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This chapter examines the evolution of macroeconomic policy and institutions over the long term and the ways in which they have influenced the growth path of the Brazilian economy. It establishes that a critical influence on the disappointing growth performance realized was a failure to neutralize the effects of exchange rate induced Dutch Disease. In addition to this, Brazil’s economic dynamism has been inhibited by the pursuit of a growth with current account deficits (“foreign savings”) policy; an exchange rate anchor policy to control inflation; and a high level of interest rates. Collectively, these factors have reduced the productivity and competitiveness of Brazil’s manufacturing industry. In addition, the interest-rate level has remained very high since the Real Plan and, from the late 1970s the investment capacity of the Brazilian state drastically decreased.

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Brazil’s Macroeconomic Policy Institutions, Quasi-Stagnation, and the Interest Rate–Exchange Rate Trap

Bresser-Perreira

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

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Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a resilient status quo

Kahler¹

2013

International Affairs

204

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Economic convergence of the large emerging economies (Brazil, China and India) on the incumbent industrialized economic powers has produced divergent predictions: rising powers are viewed as challengers of existing global governance or nascent supporters of the status quo. The preferences of rising powers, as revealed in global economic negotiations and international security regimes, indicate that they are moderate reformers that seek greater influence within existing forums and also attempt to safeguard their policy‐making autonomy. Even if their preferences change, the translation of growing economic weight into usable capabilities is not automatic. Domestic political constraints often make the mobilization of capabilities difficult in international bargaining. Strategies of collective action, whether South‐South or regional, have not yet produced a consistent increase in bargaining power at the global level. The counter‐strategies of delay and cooptation implemented by the incumbent powers have maintained incumbent influence and enhanced the legitimacy of existing global governance institutions. Risks of conflict remain along three negotiating divides: system friction, distributional conflict and institutional efficiency. Institutional innovations such as greater transparency, institutional flexibility and construction of informal transnational networks may provide modest insurance against a weakening of global governance and its institutions.

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Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF

Wade

2011

Politics & Society

160

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Many developing and transitional countries have grown faster than advanced countries in the past decade, resulting in a shift in the distribution of world income in their favor. China is now the second largest economy in the world, behind the United States and ahead of Japan. As the relative economic weight of China and several others has come to match or exceed that of the middle-ranking G7 economies, the world economy has shifted from "unipolar" toward "multipolar," less dominated by the G7. How is this change being translated into changes in authority and influence within multilateral organizations like the G20, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? Alarm bells are ringing in G7 capitals about G7 loss of influence. According to a WikiLeaks cable from the senior U.S. official for the G20 process, from January 2010, "It is remarkable how closely coordinated the BASIC group of countries [Brazil, South Africa, India, China] have become in international fora, taking turns to impede US/EU initiatives and playing the US and EU off against each other."This essay suggests that the shift in power is much smaller than the headlines or private alarm bells suggest. The United States remains the dominant state, and the G7 states together continue to exercise primacy, but now more fearfully and

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Globalization and competition: why some emergent countries succeed while others fall behind

Cited by 10 publications

References 68 publications

Brazil’s Macroeconomic Policy Institutions, Quasi-Stagnation, and the Interest Rate–Exchange Rate Trap

Brazil’s Macroeconomic Policy Institutions, Quasi-Stagnation, and the Interest Rate–Exchange Rate Trap

Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a resilient status quo

Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF

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