Global value chains and corporate lobbying for trade liberalization

Zeng, Ka; Sebold, Karen; Ya, LU

doi:10.1007/s11558-018-9337-0

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…38 Curran and Eckhardt (2018). 39 Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga (2012); Madeira (2016); Zeng, Sebold, and Lu (2020). 40 Mahutga (2014); Baccini and Dür (2018); Anderer, Dür, and Lechner (2020).…”

Section: Determinants Of Bargaining Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining Power in a Globalized World: The Effect of Global Value Chains in Trade Negotiations

Stiller

2023

Bus. Polit.

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What determines the bargaining power of states in international trade negotiations? The literature focuses predominantly on economic strength as the determinant of bargaining power. However, this explanation neglects the reality of modern trade, which is characterized by the globalization of production and high levels of economic interdependence. I argue that this interdependence undermines the effect of economic strength on the bargaining power of states. Specifically, I hypothesize that the effect of economic strength declines when a country's companies rely on inputs for their production from a negotiation partner because they are integrated into global value chains. The more a country's firms are dependent on a partner country, the less that country is able to coerce concessions from the partner country by bringing to bear its economic strength. To test this hypothesis, I use a dataset covering concessions on liberalization of the services sector made by 54 countries in 61 preferential trade agreements. By calculating the relative concessions of each partner, I construct a quantitative indicator of the outcome of trade negotiations. This indicator should reflect the underlying bargaining power of each negotiating party. The results of a regression analysis of these negotiation outcomes mostly support my hypotheses.

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Section: Determinants Of Bargaining Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining Power in a Globalized World: The Effect of Global Value Chains in Trade Negotiations

Stiller

2023

Bus. Polit.

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“…This perspective is extended to the analysis of trade policy [32,33]. The idea that trade policy can be influenced by external factors exemplifies how politicians are not entirely free from the influence of economically powerful constituencies [34][35][36].…”

Section: New Political Economy Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade Liberalization, Distributional Coalitions and Economic Growth: A Case of Vietnam

Lee

2023

Sustainability

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This paper examines the economic growth of Vietnam by focusing on trade liberalization and the strategies that the distributional coalitions have chosen in response to this reform. It analyses the tariff schedules annexed to six key free trade agreements that Vietnam signed. This paper finds that the distributional coalitions intentionally under-protect three groups of products to keep their benefits. Group 1 consists of products with high amounts of revealed comparative advantages (RCAs) and a strong presence in the state sector. Group 2 comprises products with low RCAs and a tenuous presence of the state sector. Group 3 represents products where the presence of the state sector is strong, but their production capacities cannot meet the massive domestic demand. The strategically administered under-protection has also allowed the distributional coalitions to preserve their privileges. While these strategies have been effective in achieving static efficiency, they have been considerably less effective in bringing about structural changes necessary for sustainable long-run economic growth.

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“…Among US producers, the rise of importing from China and offshoring to China therefore creates a large special interest constituency that strongly favors bilateral openness (Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga, 2012;Manger, 2012;Osgood, 2018;Zeng, Sebold and Lu, 2018). In certain select industries (apparel, retail, toys and electronics manufacturing) virtually every firm large or small is wholly or partly dependent on sourcing from China.…”

Section: Three Theories Of Producers' Positions On Us-china Tradementioning

confidence: 99%

Firms Fight Back: Production Networks and Corporate Opposition to the China Trade War

Osgood

Lee

2020

Preprint

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The Trump administration's multi-front trade war dramatically escalated with the imposition of extraordinary tariffs on Chinese imports in 2018. Corporate America has responded with a concerted campaign of resistance. We document these effortsthrough extensive participation in notice and comment and public coalition-buildingand show that corporate opposition to the trade war derives from reliance on sourcing and production ties to China. In contrast, we find far weaker efforts by anti-trade firms to support the trade war, whether to insulate themselves from import competition or to confront Chinese trade practices. We therefore describe and empirically illustrate the politics of global production networks, and highlight that scholars of trade politics should not neglect opposition to the Trump trade agenda arising from globally integrated firms. Global order in the area of trade hangs in the balance in an ongoing fight between corporate globalism and populist nationalism.

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Global value chains and corporate lobbying for trade liberalization

Cited by 10 publications

References 49 publications

Bargaining Power in a Globalized World: The Effect of Global Value Chains in Trade Negotiations

Bargaining Power in a Globalized World: The Effect of Global Value Chains in Trade Negotiations

Trade Liberalization, Distributional Coalitions and Economic Growth: A Case of Vietnam

Firms Fight Back: Production Networks and Corporate Opposition to the China Trade War

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