Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths

Hirvelä, Jaakko

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1511-z

Cited by 31 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…If the basis is individuated in a fine-grained way, then fewer propositions would be relevant which might make the safety condition fail to eliminate epistemic luck. If the basis is individuated in a coarse-grained way, then more propositions would be relevant which would make it very difficult to know 5 Hirvelä (2019) argues that we should only consider beliefs that are formed on the same virtuous method and propositions which belong to the same subject matter of inquiry as the target proposition. To put it formally, SAFETY H : S's belief that p, which belongs to her subject matter of inquiry Q, formed on a virtuous method V, is safe, if and only if, in all nearby possible worlds where S forms a belief in a proposition that belongs to Q via the virtuous method V, S's belief is true.…”

Section: Safety Globalizedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It was then suggested that, when evaluating whether the target belief is safe or not, we should also take beliefs in some other relevant propositions in similar cases into consideration. What results from this suggestion is a globalized version of the safety condition (Ball, 2016;Blome-Tillmann, 2017;Grundmann, 2020;Hirvelä, 2019;Manley, 2007;Pritchard, 2009Pritchard, , 2012aPritchard, , 2013Pritchard, , 2016Williamson, 2000Williamson, , 2009. But which propositions are relevant when evaluating whether a belief is safe?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

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A Dilemma for Globalized Safety

2021

Acta Anal

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The safety condition is supposed to be a necessary condition on knowledge which helps to eliminate epistemic luck. It has been argued that the condition should be globalized to a set of propositions rather than the target proposition believed to account for why not all beliefs in necessary truths are safe. A remaining issue is which propositions are relevant when evaluating whether the target belief is safe or not. In the literature, solutions have been proposed to determine the relevance of propositions. This paper examines a case of luckily true belief—thus a case of ignorance—and a case of knowledge. It argues that no solution in the literature offers a correct verdict in either case. Therefore, the strategy to globalize safety remains unsatisfactory.

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Section: Safety Globalizedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

A Dilemma for Globalized Safety

2021

Acta Anal

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“…Instead, we will understand the notion of epistemic success to be tied up with a person's having an answer to a relevant question. For arguments to this effect see Grundmann (2020, sec. 2), Hirvelä (2019) and Zhao (2019, secs. 2, 4 and 5).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Making a difference in virtue epistemology

Hundertmark

Kindley

2021

Synthese

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Virtue Reliabilism holds that knowledge is a cognitive achievement—an epistemic success that is creditable to the cognitive abilities of the knowing subject. Beyond this consensus, there is much disagreement amongst proponents of virtue reliabilism about the conditions under which the credit-relation between an epistemic success and a person’s cognitive abilities holds. This paper aims to establish a new and attractive view of this crucial relation in terms of difference-making. We will argue that the resulting theory, Difference-Making Virtue Epistemology, can deal with cases of epistemic luck and testimonial knowledge while revealing the common core of knowledge and other achievements.

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“…For proponents of at least one condition, seePritchard (2005Pritchard ( , 2012,Williamson (1994Williamson ( , 2000Williamson ( , 2009,Greco (2003aGreco ( , 2003bGreco ( , 2010, Lasonen-Aarnio (2010),Manley (2007),Sosa (2007), Dutant (2010, andHirvelä (2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

Non‐Accidental Knowing

Paterson¹

2020

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Knowledge excludes luck. According to the received view, this intuition reveals that knowing is essentially modal in character. This paper demurs. Either knowledge does not exclude luck, or the entailment reveals nothing about its conceptual character. It is argued that knowledge excludes accidentality, and that this notion is not modal but causal-explanatory. There are three central tasks. The first is to explicate the concept of accident. The second is to argue that the concepts of luck and accident are "intensionally distinct," which is to say that no member of the intension of either holds on both. The third is to argue that an anti-accident requirement on knowledge is preferable to an anti-luck analogue on abductive grounds. 1 See Vogel (2007). Niall J. Paterson completed his PhD in 2019 at the University of Bristol under the supervision of Alexander Bird and Jason Konek. Following this, he worked as a postdoctoral researcher on the ERC funded project "Competence and Success in Epistemology and Beyond" at the University of Helsinki. His primary areas of research are epistemology and metaphysics, with a focus on the intersection of the two.

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Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths

Cited by 31 publications

References 35 publications

A Dilemma for Globalized Safety

A Dilemma for Globalized Safety

Making a difference in virtue epistemology

Non‐Accidental Knowing

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