Global Promulgation – Regional Implementation?

China and the “Responsibility to Protect”: The Implications of the Libyan Intervention

“…It adopted a strategy of ''norm containment'' in which it continued to downplay the link between R2P and non-consensual military intervention. 39 China also resisted efforts by UN officials to elaborate and refine the concept of R2P, insisting that resolution 1674 (2006) 40 be limited to a reaffirmation of the key paragraphs of the World Summit Outcome Document. 41 In line with this strategy of containment, China emphasized the preventive dimension of R2P and stressed the pillar one requirement that the primary responsibility to protect lies with the state concerned.…”

“…Though it continued to insist that any international action should be carried out with state consent in accordance with R2P's second pillar, China's acknowledgement of the need for external intervention represented a softening of its traditional rigid interpretation of the principle of non-intervention. 42 China's overall position towards R2P since 2005 has been described as ''preserv[ing] the vestiges of its once firm stance on non-interference-the requirement for host state consent for collective military deployment-without appearing to completely turn a blind eye to mass atrocities''. 43 The impact of China's apparent shift towards a partial accommodation of R2P should not, however, be overstated.…”

“…50 These image-related considerations have contributed to a gradual softening of the Chinese position on R2P. 51 Second, the expansion of China's overseas business interests has necessitated a more outward-looking foreign policy that is prepared to consider intervening in other states' internal affairs in order to safeguard or promote Chinese interests. 52 This has made it more difficult for China to insist on a rigid conception of state sovereignty and non-interference.…”