Global Production Networks and International Inequality: Making a Case for a Meso-Level Turn in Macro-Comparative Sociology

Abstract

Abstract

Power, governance and distributional skew in global value chains: Exchange theoretic and exogenous factors

“…The key variable in what we describe as an ‘exchange‐theoretic’ model is the ratio of suppliers to buyers obtaining for a given exchange. We concur with power‐dependence theory that the power of any particular actor in a network of possible exchanges depends on “(1) the extent to which other actors value his/her resources, (2) the number of exchange partners available to the focal actor, and (3) the number of alternative exchange partners available to the focal actor's alters” (Mahutga, 2014: 13; also see Dindial et al., 2020). Thus, the possession of a valuable resource(s) by a central actor, or lead firm in GVC parlance, is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of a network structure that maximizes the available supplier ties to a lead firm and limits the supply of equally attractive exchange partners to its alters.…”

Power and its sources in the governance of global value chains: The Argentina–European Union biodiesel value chain

“…While Wallerstein's argument most often refers to producers and, hence, their interest in gaining monopoly rents, the same logic applies to the case of buyers, as monopsonistic conditions allow them to appropriate higher levels of value at the expense of producers. The relevance of monopsonies, in addition to that of monopolies, has been emphasized in a more recent literature that seeks to integrate Wallerstein's vision of competition with GVC analysis (Clelland, 2014; Mahutga, 2014), while Quentin and Campling (2017) have highlighted monopsony as a key concept for complementing the analysis of value ‘addition’ with that of value ‘appropriation’. Hence in what follows, unless stated otherwise, my discussion about competition applies to both producers/monopolies and buyers/monopsonies.…”

“…22Mahutga (2014) speaks of ‘positional power’ in order to account for chain actors who benefit from what here has been described as quasi‐monopoly and monopsony positions. His notion, however, represents only one face of the concept of a ‘positional source of power’ introduced here, as the latter seeks to expand such understanding in order to also account for those contexts of high competition in which competitive advantage becomes a determining factor.…”

Global value chains and quantitative macro-comparative sociology

“…With respect to economic development, a key argument has been that countries where firms tend to play a leading role in their value chains will experience greater gains from globalization than those with firms who play a more subordinate role (e.g., Mahutga, 2014aMahutga, , 2014cBair and Mahutga, 2016;Pandian, 2016). The key mechanism is the asymmetrical power of leading firms, who squeeze costs from their suppliers in poor countries (Heintz, 2006).…”