Global oscillations in the Optional Public Goods Game under spatial diffusion

Valverde, Pablo A.; Silva, Roberto da; Stock, Eduardo Velasco

doi:10.1016/j.physa.2017.01.056

Cited by 13 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Control of corruption in public institutions requires effort and resources [25] . Our results suggest measures that are relatively simple and have low cost to implement.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling systemic corruption through group size and salary dispersion of public servants

Valverde,

Fernández,

Buenaño

et al. 2024

Heliyon

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“…Control of corruption in public institutions requires effort and resources [25] . Our results suggest measures that are relatively simple and have low cost to implement.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling systemic corruption through group size and salary dispersion of public servants

Valverde,

Fernández,

Buenaño

et al. 2024

Heliyon

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“…In a model [4] with asymmetric diffusion rate for the cooperators and the defectors in a population with the ecological public goods games played in subpopulations leads to pattern formations in the densities of the cooperators and the defectors. When a third strategy, loner-agent who does not participate in public goods game-is incorporated [82] in the optional public goods game along with the two usual strategies (viz. cooperate and defect), the frequencies of the strategies undergo global oscillations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Amplitude death in coupled replicator map lattice: averting migration dilemma

Sadhukhan,

Chattopadhyay,

Chakraborty

2021

Preprint

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Populations composed of a collection of subpopulations (demes) with random migration between them are quite common occurrences. The emergence and sustenance of cooperation in such a population is a highly researched topic in the evolutionary game theory. If the individuals in every deme are considered to be either cooperators or defectors, the migration dilemma can be envisaged: The cooperators would not want to migrate to a defector-rich deme as they fear of facing exploitation; but without migration, cooperation can not be established throughout the network of demes. With a view to studying the aforementioned scenario, in this paper, we set up a theoretical model consisting of a coupled map lattice of replicator maps based on two-player-two-strategy games. The replicator map considered is capable of showing a variety of evolutionary outcomes, like convergent (fixed point) outcomes and nonconvergent (periodic and chaotic) outcomes. Furthermore, this coupled network of the replicator maps undergoes the phenomenon of amplitude death leading to nonoscillatory stable synchronized states. We specifically explore the effect of (i) the nature of coupling that models migration between the maps, (ii) the heterogenous demes (in the sense that not all the demes have same game being played by the individuals), (iii) the degree of the network, and (iv) the cost associated with the migration. In the course of investigation, we are intrigued by the effectiveness of the random migration in sustaining a uniform cooperator fraction across a population irrespective of the details of the replicator dynamics and the interaction among the demes.

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“…In this sense, research has shown that in a spatial environment, mobility and percolation thresholds have a critical impact on the sustenance of biodiversity in nature [19,[26][27][28][29][30][31]. Interestingly, despite a large number of papers discussing the effects of mobility in the PD [32][33][34][35][36][37], the rock-paper-scissors [25,38,39] and the optional public goods games [40][41][42], the impact of mobility in the context of the VPD game is still almost unknown. Indeed, some effort has also been made to explore contingent movement strategies modelling the so-called 'winstay, lose-move' rule, which, as also argued by Szabó and Fáth [5], might capture the concept of abstention in the sense that agents abstain by moving away from their opponents [43][44][45][46].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobility restores the mechanism which supports cooperation in the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma game

Cardinot¹,

O’Riordan²,

Griffith³

et al. 2019

New J. Phys.

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It is generally believed that in a situation where individual and collective interests are in conflict, the availability of optional participation is a key mechanism to maintain cooperation. Surprisingly, this effect is sensitive to the use of microscopic dynamics and can easily be broken when agents make a fully rational decision during their strategy updates. In the framework of the celebrated prisoner's dilemma game, we show that this discrepancy can be fixed automatically if we leave the strict and frequently artifact condition of a fully occupied interaction graph, and allow agents to change not just their strategies but also their positions according to their success. In this way, a diluted graph where agents may move offers a natural and alternative way to handle artifacts arising from the application of specific and sometimes awkward microscopic rules.

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Global oscillations in the Optional Public Goods Game under spatial diffusion

Cited by 13 publications

References 20 publications

Controlling systemic corruption through group size and salary dispersion of public servants

Controlling systemic corruption through group size and salary dispersion of public servants

Amplitude death in coupled replicator map lattice: averting migration dilemma

Mobility restores the mechanism which supports cooperation in the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma game

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