Global norms and major state behaviour: The cases of China and the United States

Abstract

When do major states conform to or diverge from global behavioural norms? We argue that existing theories find it difficult to explain important aspects of this variation in behaviour and we offer instead a framework consisting of three explanatory variables: degree of ‘fit’ between global norms and dominant domestic-level norms; actor perceptions of procedural and substantive legitimacy; and actor perceptions of consequences for the global power hierarchy. We argue that the relative importance of these variables is contingent on the level of domestic salience of the issue area. When salience is high, the degree of normative fit is the primary driver of behavioural consistency; when salience is low, degree of fit becomes less important and the other two variables play a more powerful role in driving behavioural outcomes. We demonstrate how this framework helps to account for the behaviour of the two most important states in the global system, China and the United States, in five areas of central importance to the contemporary global order: the limited use of force, macroeconomic policy surveillance, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, climate protection and financial regulation. Our argument also explains why globalization may reduce rather than increase levels of behavioural consistency with global norms.

Environmental Regulation of a Global Pollution Externality in a Bilateral Trade Framework: The Case of Global Warming, China and the US

“…Similar arguments, that the close economic relations between the US and China will lead to greater cooperation on global environmental issues, have been put forth by Antholis (2009), Foot (2010 and Foot and Walter (2013). Antholis (2009) suggests that the US and China need to focus on concrete partnerships as a way of demonstrating progress and cooperation between the two nations.…”

“…Such an incentive may explain the outcome at the December 2011 climate change negotiations in Durban, South Africa, which saw the US and China agreeing to a framework for a prospective and comprehensive climate change agreement in 2015 (Ewing 2012). A growing literature has argued that closer bilateral trade and economic ties between the two countries should lead them to cooperate on global issues, such as climate change (Antholis 2009;Foot 2010;Foot and Walter 2013;Lieberthal and Sandalow 2009).…”

“…However, the Durban Platform is most notable for securing the tentative inclusion of the United States and China -the world's two biggest GHG emitters -who were not signatories to the Kyoto Protocol (Ewing 2012). The signing of the Durban Platform by United States and China accords with the view expressed by some scholars that closer bilateral trade and economic ties between the two countries would foster their cooperation on a number of global issues, including combating climate change (Antholis 2009;Foot 2010;Foot and Walter 2013;Lieberthal and Sandalow 2009). As argued by Foot and Walter (2012, p.20), "…globalization…has greatly raised the importance of the bilateral China-US relationship.…”

“…(Foot 2010) argues that cooperation between China and the US is vital for addressing global economic crisis and global challenges such as climatic change. Foot and Walter (2013) state the US and China are two important countries that are central to the global economy and climatic protection. The two states are very pivotal to the evolution of the global climatic control policy Our paper seeks to analyze how the increasing bilateral trade and capital relationships between the US and China might influence their policy coordination over a global pollution externality, such as climate change.…”

Criminal accountability at what cost? Norm conflict, UN peace operations and the International Criminal Court

“…We expect that low salience facilitates the choice for norm reconciliation because the potential costs that are involved in adapting norms are likely to be lower. Because of the lower political sensitivity and the lower impact on its daily operations, IO actors have a larger room for manoeuvre (Foot and Walter, 2013) and may thus seek a strategy that allows them to implement both valued norms (albeit in weakened form). In other words, they opt for norm reconciliation.…”