Global Incentives for International Public Goods

Ferroni, Marco; Mody, Ashoka

doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-0979-0_1

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…If, for instance, the index of public benefits is two-thirds, then roughly two-thirds of the transfer should be in the form of a grant and the remainder in a loan. By reflecting recipient benefit shares in aid-funded activities, this index provides a rough rule of thumb for the grant-loan mix consistent with the recommendations of Ferroni and Mody (2002) and the World Bank (2001). The more public is the activity, the greater should be the share of grants in the transferred funds.…”

Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning

confidence: 87%

Donors' Mechanisms for Financing International and National Public Goods: Loans or Grants?

Mascarenhas

Sandler

2005

World Economy

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This paper investigates whether three classes of donors – multilateral organisations, regional institutions and bilateral donors – tailor their mix of grants and loans to reflect international benefit spillovers and recipient‐specific benefits, derived from aid‐funded activities in developing and transition countries. To account for recipient benefit shares, donors should use a greater share of grants when supported activities yield a larger portion of international public benefits. A greater reliance on loans is appropriate when a large portion of recipient‐specific benefits are associated with the assistance. By reflecting recipient benefit shares in the grant‐loan mix, donors’ assistance also promotes allocative efficiency. Using the Credit Reporting System (CRS) database from OECD for 1980–2000, our analysis establishes that various donor classes apply different grant‐loan mixtures when supporting the environment, health, knowledge and governance sectors of recipient countries. We employ analysis of variance and other statistical comparisons of the means to investigate differences among donor classes. We demonstrate that bilateral donors do the best job in tailoring their grant‐loan mix to accord with the extent of international public good benefits embodied in the aid‐supported activity. Multilateral organisations’ grant‐loan mix is intermediate of the three types of donors, with some evidence of them relying more on grants to finance activities that possess a larger share of international public good spillovers. Regional institutions, however, do not discriminate their grant‐loan mix by either sectors or the associated public good spillovers. This finding suggests that regional development banks need to adjust their grant‐loan mix to better account for international benefit spillovers if these institutions are to warrant the increased funds to underwrite regional public goods that they have been seeking. If, however, their mix is institutionally set, then the stakeholders must give these institutions greater flexibility to tailor their grants and loans to who benefits from the aid‐supported public goods. This is the first paper to empirically ascertain whether the grant‐loan mix is tied to the inherent publicness of the aid‐funded activities.

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Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning

confidence: 87%

Donors' Mechanisms for Financing International and National Public Goods: Loans or Grants?

Mascarenhas

Sandler

2005

World Economy

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“…These are important issues for the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and its network of agricultural research centers,1 arguably the organizations best placed to bridge the gap between cutting‐edge technological advances emerging in industrialized countries, and applications thereof to developing‐country agriculture (World Bank, 2004; CGIAR IRP, 2008). The CGIAR plays a unique role in the world of agricultural research as a provider global public goods—non‐rival, non‐excludable public goods such as scientific research that can be produced and/or consumed in more than one country at a given point in time, and are characterized by coordination problems that render them unattractive to individual governments and private agents (Ferroni and Mody, 2002; Sandler, 2002, 2003; Kaul et al ., 2003; Dalrymple, 2006). Its current structural reform efforts aimed at strengthening the responsiveness and dynamism are designed partly to improve its ability to leverage scientific and technological advances emerging from the private sector (see, for example, CGIAR, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public–private partnerships and developing‐country agriculture: Evidence from the international agricultural research system

Spielman

Hartwich

Grebmer

2010

Public Admin & Development

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SUMMARYThis study examines the role of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in promoting pro-poor productivity-enhancing technological innovation in the international agricultural research system. The study examines the extent to which PPPs are being used to overcome market and institutional failures that otherwise inhibit the development and dissemination of technologies targeted specifically to small-scale, resource-poor farmers in developing countries. Drawing on a survey of 75 PPP projects in the international system, findings suggest that while PPPs are changing the way the system manages its research agenda, few partnerships lead to joint innovation processes with the private sector. This indicates the need for closer examination of organizational practices, cultures, and incentives in the international agricultural research system.

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“…If the marginal local benefits of public good provision are less than the marginal local costs, there will be no incentive to provide the public good at all. If the marginal local benefits of public good provision exceed the marginal local costs of provision, but benefits also accrue to other countries, there will be an incentive to produce the public good, but unless the country is a 'best-shot provider' it will not be at a level that would satisfy international demand (Ferroni and Mody 2002;Kanbur 2003Kanbur , 2004. We first of all review the problem and then consider the options for addressing it.…”

Section: Why Are International Environmental Public Goods Underprovided?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Paying for International Environmental Public Goods

Arriagada

Perrings

2011

AMBIO

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Global Incentives for International Public Goods

Cited by 9 publications

References 8 publications

Donors' Mechanisms for Financing International and National Public Goods: Loans or Grants?

Donors' Mechanisms for Financing International and National Public Goods: Loans or Grants?

Public–private partnerships and developing‐country agriculture: Evidence from the international agricultural research system

Paying for International Environmental Public Goods

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