2017
DOI: 10.1177/0148558x17696759
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Global Financial Crisis, Institutional Ownership, and the Earnings Informativeness of Income Smoothing

Abstract: This study uses unbalanced panel data to construct the empirical regressions, and examines the role of the global financial crisis and institutional ownership on the earnings informativeness of firm with income smoothing. The result reveals that the earnings informativeness of income smoothing decreased after the occurrence of the crisis. High institutional ownership also reduces the informativeness of earnings for firms with income smoothing and supports the institutional investors’ opportunism hypothesis. Ye… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Likewise, Habib et al (2013) provide some evidence that discretionary accruals became less informative during the global financial crisis of 2008 in New Zealand. Based on the Taiwan data, Chen et al (2020) examine whether the informativeness of income smoothing was influenced by the global financial crisis. Their results suggest that income smoothing was less efficient in communicating private information to investors during the crisis period.…”
Section: Related Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Likewise, Habib et al (2013) provide some evidence that discretionary accruals became less informative during the global financial crisis of 2008 in New Zealand. Based on the Taiwan data, Chen et al (2020) examine whether the informativeness of income smoothing was influenced by the global financial crisis. Their results suggest that income smoothing was less efficient in communicating private information to investors during the crisis period.…”
Section: Related Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It also strives to match the goals of management with those of stakeholders. In other words, the majority of decisions in companies are made by managers whose motivations are not always completely aligned with those of outside investors, which means that manager–shareholder disputes are caused by unobservable managerial motivations and behaviors (Chen et al , 2020). In this situation, agency theory supports the use of control techniques to reduce the EM practices, and improve the company performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The earnings informativeness of income smoothing decreased after the occurrence of the crisis. High institutional ownership also reduces the informativeness of earnings for firms with income smoothing and supports the institutional investors' opportunism hypothesis (Chen, Weng, & Lin, 2017). In discretionary accrual policy, if it provides earnings informativeness, then the policy increases earnings quality (Dechow & Dichev, 2002).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 60%