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Spira, Laura F.

doi:10.1023/a:1009926203363

Cited by 83 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Following a presentation that the board receives positively, one NED indicates in public that he nevertheless needs to think of a challenging question to ask. This comment suggests that challenging or questioning is a necessary ritual, irrespective of the situation, and illustrates Spira's (1999, p. 248) “ceremonial aspect” of challenge.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…In these interactions, individuals anticipate the views of others and conform their behaviours to elicit desired responses from those salient others. This perspective reflects Spira's (1999Spira's ( , 2002 view of audit committees (board-ofdirectors' sub-committees) as ceremonial.…”

Section: Accountability and Impression Managementmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…First, the public audience can appreciate that the NEDs challenge the managers and that the managers respond to that challenge. Hence, challenge is performed and, from the perspective of the audience, “the satisfactory handling of searching questions … reflects well on all concerned, enhancing reputations …” (Spira, 1999, p. 248). The second effect of acknowledge the challenge is to refocus the interaction away from the question posed, and instead on to the notion of challenge itself, consequently distracting from what may be seen as a threat to the performance.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Impression management at board meetings: accountability in public and in private

Pernelet,

Brennan

2023

AAAJ

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PurposeTo demonstrate transparency and accountability, the three boards in this study are required to meet in public in front of an audience, although the boards reserve confidential issues for discussion in private sessions. This study examines boardroom public accountability, contrasting it with accountability in board meetings held in private. The study adopts Erving Goffman's impression management theory to interpret divergences between boardroom behaviour in public and private, or “frontstage” and “backstage” in Goffman's terminology.Design/methodology/approachThe research observes and video-records three board meetings for each of the three boards (nine board meetings), in public and private. The research operationalises accountability in terms of director-manager question-and-answer interactions.FindingsIn the presence of an audience of local stakeholders, the boards employ impression management techniques to demonstrate accountability, by creating the impression that non-executive directors are performing challenge and managers are providing satisfactory answers. Thus, they “save the show” in Goffman terms. These techniques enable board members and managers to navigate the interface between demonstrating the required good governance and the competence of the organisations and their managers, while not revealing issues that could tarnish their image and concern the stakeholders. The boards need to demonstrate to the audience that “matters are what they appear to be”, even if they are not. The research identifies behaviour consistent with impression management to manage this complexity. The authors conclude that regulatory objectives have not met their transparency aspirations.Originality/valueFor the first time, the research studies the effect of transparency regulations (“sunshine” laws) on the behaviour of boards of directors meeting in public. The study contributes to the embryonic literature based on video-taped board meetings to access the “black box” of the boardroom, which permits a study of impression management at board meetings not previously possible. This study extends prior impression management theory by identifying eleven impression management techniques that non-executive directors and managers use and which are unique to a boardroom context.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Accountability and Impression Managementmentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Impression management at board meetings: accountability in public and in private

Pernelet,

Brennan

2023

AAAJ

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“…Hotel Sector F&B Sector which investigated the same relationship (Habbash, 2010;Davidson et al, 2005;Abdul & Ali;Baxter & Cotter, 2009;Spira, 1999). As per the results of descriptive statistics, companies listed in the food and beverage sector have complied with the policies made by the regulatory bodies, such as establishing an audit committee for the companies and conducting regular meetings.…”

Section: Comparison Of Total Accrualsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Audit Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Sri Lanka: Food & Beverage and Hotel Sectors

Randenigala,

Wijesinghe

2024

Kelaniya J Manage

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The company's earnings are crucial for investors' decision-making since they provide emblems about value-creating ability. However, with the possibility of manipulating earnings, the whole purpose of financial reporting becomes valueless. External independent auditing can be identified as a control mechanism that minimises earnings management. This study examines the impact of audit quality on earnings management in the food and beverage sector and hotel companies in the Colombo Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2019. The real earnings management approach and total accruals are used to measure the earnings quality, while audit firm size, presence of the audit committee, frequency of the audit committee meetings and audit timeliness are the audit quality proxies. The study used regression analysis as the main analysis tool, and the findings reveal the existence of earnings management in the food and beverage and hotel sectors. Fascinatingly, audit quality does not significantly impact earnings management in the food and beverage sector, while it exists in the hotel sector. Moreover, companies' size and leverage significantly impact earnings management in both sectors. These findings suggest that effective regulation and monitoring are necessary to improve audit quality for both sectors, especially in the hotel sector companies in Sri Lanka. Hence, enhancing audit quality would minimise earnings management and improve earnings quality, which is instrumental to the decision-makers, especially investors and creditors. Henceforth, we suggest improving the audit quality in the food and beverage and hotel sectors and enhancing disclosure requirements such as research and development expenses, audit time, and non-audit services.

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“…The ideas underlying ANT (Latour, 2004) have been applied in management, governance and organizational studies. One of these papers are Laura Spira (2000) who investigates the role of audit committees through ANT, following the evidence of audit committees broadly applied to secure good governance in a UK context (Conyon, 1997).…”

Section: Company Identities and Societal Demandsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Scandals: In The Age of ‘Responsible Business’

Kjær

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This thesis examines how corporate scandals work, the circumstances that make them possible, and how they are accounted for by wider society. The thesis finds that first, companies with high social responsibility scores (according to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings) are more prone to scandals compared to a matched control group. Second, it finds that the Danske Bank money laundering scandal emerged and endured through the interaction of different social-control agents who formed a framing coalition against the alleged company. Third, the thesis finds that identities of companies ending up in scandals are configurated through interactions of human and nonhuman actors, including framing devices and experts. Recently a new stream of literature has emerged within the social-evaluation literature, analyzing the role of social-control agents in scandal emergence, and in doing so, viewing scandals as a social construction. Addressing this emerging stream of scandal research, this thesis examines the phenomenon of corporate scandals in the age of ‘responsible business.’ The first chapter, Deceived by ‘S’: corporate scandals and ESG, examines if ESG ratings (a measure of good behavior) can predict scandals. The empirical inquiry is built on a comprehensive data material: a unique, hand collected sample of 113 global corporate scandals and a corresponding control group. Using logit regressions, the first chapter finds that scandals happen in otherwise perceived ‘socially responsible companies’ (with high ‘S’ scores, according to ESG rating agencies). In doing so, this thesis contributes with new empirical evidence to a growing stream of literature that takes a critical view on the reliability of ESG rating providers. This unexpected – and thought-provoking – finding not only raises questions about the reliability of the ratings, but also about how scandals work and are accounted for. The subsequent two chapters address these questions. The second chapter, How social-control agents interact in scandal emergence: insights from Danske Bank, examines how scandals emerge and endure. In doing so, it examines how different social-control agents interact therein. Shifting the methodological approach to a qualitative deep dive case study, this chapter analyzes the Danske Bank money laundering scandal through large data material and original interviews with central persons involved. Drawing on Goffman (1959) and Entman (1993) allows for analyzing interactions of multiple social-control agents. In doing so, the analysis reveals how a framing coalition of different social-control agents were formed to create a case against Danske Bank in the money laundering scandal. With this framing coalition the case went from being isolated to misconduct in the bank’s Estonian branch to being a global scandal. This chapter contributes to existing social evaluation literature with the theory concept of a framing coalition developed by combining Entman (1993) and Goffman (1959). It shows how different social-control agents impose each their framings on the audience and interact with each other with each their frontstage and backstage. In the third chapter, Framing and overflowing in corporate scandals, the focus shifts to the company. Drawing on actor-network theory (ANT) and Callon’s (1998) twin notions of framing and overflow, this chapter examines how company identities are configurated before and during scandal emergence. The analysis of four corporate scandals finds that nonhuman framing devices, such as medical labels and certifications, contribute to establishing a frame of companies, serving as façades. In addition, it shows how experts played a central role in purifying the frame of the scandal firm.

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Untitled

Cited by 83 publications

References 30 publications

Impression management at board meetings: accountability in public and in private

Impression management at board meetings: accountability in public and in private

Audit Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Sri Lanka: Food & Beverage and Hotel Sectors

Corporate Scandals: In The Age of ‘Responsible Business’

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Untitled

Cited by 83 publications

References 30 publications

Impression management at board meetings: accountability in public and in private

Impression management at board meetings: accountability in public and in private

Audit Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Sri Lanka: Food &amp; Beverage and Hotel Sectors

Corporate Scandals: In The Age of ‘Responsible Business’

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Product

Resources

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Audit Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Sri Lanka: Food & Beverage and Hotel Sectors