Giving is a Question of Time: Response Times and Contributions to an Environmental Public Good

Lohse, Johannes; Goeschl, Timo; Diederich, Johannes

doi:10.1007/s10640-016-0029-z

Cited by 33 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Kesternich, Löschel, & Ziegler et al (2014) reveal that the burden sharing rules can partially reduce fairness bias in emission reduction negotiation. Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, (2017) find the positive correlation between mean response time and contribution of each party. Currently, practices have proved the important role of multilateral negotiation in international climate cooperation.…”

Section: Bargaining Communication and International Climate Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 71%

Behavioral Psychology Analysis of Individual Decision, Strategic Interaction and Climate Governance

2020

RACP

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Considering the limitations of standard economics in the research of climate governance, this paper employs the behavioral economics theory and behavioral psychology to explain the individual decision in the climate governance and the strategic interaction between countries. Firstly, realistic framework of behavioral economics was constructed, which covers psychological factors like quasi-hyperbolic discounting, value function, loss aversion, fairness, and reciprocity. The established framework was then compared with the standard economic model. The main results are as follows: on individual decision, the bounded rationality is limited by the inconsistency between loss aversion and time preference, adding to the difficulty of emission reduction; on strategic interaction, fairness is the key to international climate negotiation; the negotiating parties should set fair rules on emission reduction and restrain the excessive self-interested behaviors of developed countries; the prisoner's dilemma in international climate negotiation can be solved through cooperation and reciprocity between low self-interested parties; an effective communication mechanism is essential to the success of global climate governance.

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Section: Bargaining Communication and International Climate Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 71%

Behavioral Psychology Analysis of Individual Decision, Strategic Interaction and Climate Governance

2020

RACP

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“…Faster decisions are also related to higher offers during the dictator game and rejections of unfair offers during the ultimatum game (Cappelen et al, 2016;Halali et al, 2011). However, other studies have also reported positive relationships between prosociality and self-paced decision time during social dilemmas (Lohse et al, 2017;Piovesan & Wengström, 2009). Moreover, Evans et al (2015) found that both selfish and cooperative decisions were faster during prisoner's dilemma and repeated public goods game, suggesting that the relationship between decision time and cooperation is quadratic (inverted-U pattern) rather than linear when the conflict level between self-interested and cooperative motives is low.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Trust Among Siblings is Intuitive

Shiramizu¹,

Holzleitner²,

O’Shea³

et al. 2019

Preprint

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Research on whether prosocial behavior is deliberate or intuitive typically uses decision time in economic games as a proxy for the automaticity of underlying cognitive processes. We investigate the relationship between trust and decision time in a sample with a predicted high baseline level of cooperative behavior and low conflict between self-interested and cooperative motives: biological siblings. Sixty-three full sibling pairs played for money in a one-shot trust game. We found a significant negative linear (rather than quadratic) effect of trust on decision time: the more money a sibling was trusted with, the quicker the decision was made. These results suggest that trust among siblings is intuitive and largely based on automatic and effortless processes.

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“…conform to a social norm, because they have difficulty processing the value of the proposed good or policy. Lohse et al (2017) test this idea in a within-sessions design with real payments and show that mean payments in previous sessions have a significant impact on WTP values for CO2 reduction. 2 Taking insights from these two strands of the literature, we hypothesize that the two types of information, social cues and objective information, interact with each other and have to be considered jointly.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When do social cues and scientific information affect stated preferences? Insights from an experiment on air pollution

Ami¹,

Aprahamian²,

Chanel³

et al. 2018

Journal of Choice Modelling

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Stated preference surveys are usually carried out in one session, without any follow-up interview after respondents have had the opportunity to experience the public goods or policies they were asked to value. Consequently, a stated preference survey needs to be designed so as to provide respondents with all the relevant information, and to help them process this information so they can perform the valuation exercise properly. In this paper, we study experimentally an elicitation procedure in which respondents are provided with a sequence of different types of information (social cues and objective information) that allows them to sequentially revise their willingness-to-pay (WTP) values. Our experiment was carried out in large groups using an electronic voting system which allows us to construct social cues in real time. To analyse the data, we developed an anchoring-type structural model that allows us to estimate the direct effect (at the current round) and the indirect effect (on subsequent rounds) of information. Our results shed new light on the interacted effect of social cues and objective information: social cues have little or no direct effect on WTP values but they have a strong indirect effect on how respondents process scientific information. Social cues have the most noticeable effect on respondents who initially report a WTP below the group average but only after receiving additional objective information about the valuation task. We suggest that the construction and the provision of social cues should be added to the list of tools and controls for stated preference methods. "Faced with the choice between changing one's mind and proving that there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the proof." Galbraith, 1971.

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Giving is a Question of Time: Response Times and Contributions to an Environmental Public Good

Cited by 33 publications

References 59 publications

Behavioral Psychology Analysis of Individual Decision, Strategic Interaction and Climate Governance

Behavioral Psychology Analysis of Individual Decision, Strategic Interaction and Climate Governance

Trust Among Siblings is Intuitive

When do social cues and scientific information affect stated preferences? Insights from an experiment on air pollution

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