Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism

Andreoni, James; Miller, John H.

doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00302

Cited by 1,574 publications

(1,507 citation statements)

References 30 publications

(29 reference statements)

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“…Our research extends the work of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) Our results confirm the importance of recognizing that individuals attach value to the act of giving. If the government were to reduce its contributions to charitable organizations and simultaneously decrease taxes by the same amount with a balanced budget fiscal policy, incomplete crowding out predicts a decrease in charitable giving, while complete crowding out predicts no change in charity revenue.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 85%

“…Our study extends Andreoni and Miller's (2002) work by showing that altruistic behavior exhibits a significant degree of rationality in a more general setting that allows for transfers to the recipient and, therefore, the possibility of crowding out.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 77%

“…Following Andreoni and Miller (2002) and the replication of their experiment by Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007), we begin by estimating the parameters of a Constant Elasticity of Substitution utility function…”

Section: Estimating Individual Preferences To Predict Out-of-sample Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Impure altruism in dictators' giving

Korenok

Millner

Razzolini

2013

Journal of Public Economics

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Abstract:We design an experiment to test whether incomplete crowding out in dictator games can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic preferences. By giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels, we create an environment in which crowding out may occur. We find that the behavior of 66 percent of the dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function.Keywords: Dictator Game, Impure Altruism, Incomplete Crowding Out JEL Classifications: C91, D01, D64, H30, H41 * We would like to thank Asen Ivanov for patience and many helpful comments and insights. We would also like to thank Rachel Croson, Doug Davis, Catherine

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 85%

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 77%

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Impure altruism in dictators' giving

Korenok

Millner

Razzolini

2013

Journal of Public Economics

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“…However, the hypothesis that individual preferences are heterogeneous (across individuals) has now been confirmed in a large number of controlled lab experiments (cf. Andreoni and Miller 2002, Choi, Fisman, Gale, and Kariv 2007a, Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits 2007, Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 2008, Von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengström 2011, Choi, Kariv, Müller, and Silverman 2014, Fisman, Jakiela, and Kariv 2014. Whether future work will also rule out the hypothesis that preferences are stable over time -at least after one properly controls for variation in income, prices, and other arguments that enter into the utility function -remains to be seen; however, we take this assumption as a natural point of departure for economic research, and focus on explanations for variation in revealed preferences (within individual over time) that are related to predictable variation in income and anticipated expenditures.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Soon Is Now? Evidence of Present Bias from Convex Time Budget Experiments

Balakrishnan¹,

Haushofer²,

Jakiela³

2017

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“…Andreoni and Miller (2002) study such altruistic preferences in the lab and …nd that a majority of people are willing to spend some money (anonymously) in order to increase the well-being of unknown others. 1 In practice, two common ways of serving the public interest are making a donation to charity and taking a job that involves helping others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Serving the public interest in several ways: Theory and empirics

Dur

Lent

2018

Labour Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract We develop a model where people di¤er in their altruistic preferences and can serve the public interest in two ways: by making donations to charity and by taking a public service job and exerting e¤ort on the job. Our theory predicts that people who are more altruistic are more likely to take a public service job and, for a given job, make higher donations to charity. Comparing equally altruistic workers, those with a regular job make higher donations to charity than those with a public service job by a simple substitution argument. We subsequently test these predictions using the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, which contains data on self-reported altruism, sector of employment, and donations to charity for more than 7,500 workers. We …nd support for our predictions, though some results are sensitive to the exact de…nition of a public service job or the estimation method. Terms of use: Documents in

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Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism

Cited by 1,574 publications

References 30 publications

Impure altruism in dictators' giving

Impure altruism in dictators' giving

How Soon Is Now? Evidence of Present Bias from Convex Time Budget Experiments

Serving the public interest in several ways: Theory and empirics

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