Give peace a chance: The effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace

Corchón, Luı́s C.; Yildizparlak, Anil

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.013

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As we do, they identify a negative relation between conflict intensity and conflict outbreak, and they relate these variables to polarization and the institutions governing peace. More generally, the theoretical literature on conflict outbreak has focused on winner-take-all contests looking at the effects of dynamic incentives (e.g., Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000), transfers (e.g., Beviá and Corchón, 2010) and asymmetric information (e.g., Bester and Wärneryd, 2006;Corchón and Yıldızparlak, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is first in studying conflict outbreak in a multi-prize contest and in linking the analysis to inequality measurement.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Inequality and conflict outbreak

Vesperoni

Yildizparlak

2019

Soc Choice Welf

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We model conflict as a multi-prize contest which takes place if a minimum number of players (which we interpret as social classes) reject the status-quo prize distribution. In the event of conflict, the status-quo prizes are reshuffled across players depending on their efforts. We first show that, for a broad family of contest models, equilibrium rent dissipation takes the form of a Generalized Gini coefficient of the prize distribution (also tackling the well-known issue of existence of an equilibrium). Secondly, we show that conflict occurs when inequality is low and deprivation (a concept that we define) is high, where these measures are computed with respect to the prize distribution. Thirdly, we find empirical evidence that supports our predictions using an unbalanced panel of 41 high and middle income countries, taking the number of labor strikes per capita as a proxy for the occurrence of conflict and measuring inequality and deprivation with respect to the income distribution.

show abstract

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Inequality and conflict outbreak

Vesperoni

Yildizparlak

2019

Soc Choice Welf

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…∂a 2 as defined in equation 13are negative. Therefore, to establish (21) it is sufficient to show that:…”

Section: Regime Strength and Natural Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Importantly, all these estimates come from the most demanding specification of the benchmark regression, that includes all the controls, continent dummies and year fixed effects. 21 In most cases the interaction of interest is negative and significant in spite of the reduction in sample size when using more extreme definitions of autocracy. This implies that the estimated coefficient of interest is very robust to the definition of autocracy that one may choose.…”

Section: Robustnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Beyond divide and rule: Weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

Luca

Sekeris

Vargas

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We propose a model where weak rulers have incentives to let ethnically divided countries plunge in civil war. Allowing inter-group fighting reduces production-and hence the tax base-but enables the ruler to devote more resources to increasing the tax rate. This mechanism is increasingly salient with larger amounts of natural resources, especially if these are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the theoretical predictions using crosscountry data, and show that our empirical results are robust to controlling for the usual determinants of civil war incidence, and to using various proxies for the ruler's relative weakness and for the presence of natural resources.

show abstract

A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Motivated by the war in Syria and the ascension of ISIS, this paper models a proxy war with three sponsors and three combatants as a dynamic game. Sponsors are leaders that provide resources for combatants to fight each other. Sponsors 1 and 2 have strong aversion to sponsor 3's proxy, but not against each other. Three pure strategy equilibria exist in the game. When the ex post value of winning is small, all players fight in equilibrium. However, when the ex post value of winning is large, in equilibrium either sponsors 1 and 2 coordinate their actions, with one of them staying out of the contest, or sponsor 3 does not participate. The probability of winning and the sponsors' payoffs depend on a spillover effect. We find that no unique way of characterizing the comparative statics of the spillover effect emerges and that the answer varies from one equilibrium to another.Finally, we identify conditions under which sponsors 1 and 2 would want to form an alliance.Alawite and Druze, who comprise 16% of the population), plus Christians (10% of the population); different ethnic groups -both Arab (90%) and non-Arab (10%); 6 and three broad political groups -the pro-establishment dictatorship of the Baath party, democrats, and Islamic fundamentalists.Each of those combatant groups has one or more sponsors: the United States and western allies, supporting political opposition to the Syrian Assad regime (who they assume think like western liberals); Russia and Iran, supporting the Assad regime (which is thought to represent Syrian Shia, Allawite, Druze, and Christians); and, finally, a loose army of international Muslim Sunni volunteers (an important part composed of Muslim Europeans), supporting and fighting for ISIS.Syria clearly is plagued by communal cleavages. Throughout its history Syria never was an independent country with a uniform ethnic-religious-political composition. After its independence from France in 1946 it struggled to find an identity. The Baath party gave Syria a much needed identity, with an ideology that is a mixture of Arab nationalism and socialism. It has a Bolshevik type of organization that permeates all regions, cities, villages, institutions and groups of Syrian society. The Baath party and the army are the only institutions that allowed a significant share of Syrian society the opportunity for social mobility, in particular for religious minorities, such as the Allawites, which ended up forming the Army's elite.General Hafiz al-Assad's 30-year dictatorship was able to consolidate power because Assad had political influence inside the Baath party and control of the Army (Hinnebusch 2014).The only major segment of Syrian society that was not under governmental influence was the poor Sunni majority, profoundly influenced by the Islamic fundamentalism of the Muslim Brotherhood

show abstract

Give peace a chance: The effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace

Cited by 10 publications

References 13 publications

Inequality and conflict outbreak

Inequality and conflict outbreak

Beyond divide and rule: Weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About