Gifts and Promises: Patronage Democracy in a Decentralised Indonesia

Abstract

Can democracy exist in a social structure marred with patron-client networks? How do we define the situation in which democratic elections occur in tandem with the dyadic relations between elites and followers? "Gift:s and Promises" sheds a light into the Indonesian local politics after decentralization. Despite the central state's effort towards democratization, such as sponsoring direct elections for district leaders, the local politics depicted patronclient relations between the elite candidates and the voters. Benefiting from the direct elections, the elites competed for political power in the regions by mobilizing ethno-religious sentiments and utilizing money-politics. The voters, in return, behave as clients as they seek to gain material benefits from their preferred candidates in exchange for political loyalty. However, the direct elections also created a novelty in patron-client relations: the opinion of the clients, now voters, became crucial in determining new leaders. The article reveals that, as voters, the clients had the opponunity to examine the qualities of candidates based on traditional "elite capitals". Taking the examples from three districts in North Sumatra, the article shows that the direct elections allow common people to behave as citizens (voters) and clients interchangeably. This condition propagated the system of Patronage Democracy, in which clientelistic practices exist side by side with democratization and continue to challenge the notion of Indonesian citizenship.

Between Clientelism and Patrimonialism: Local Politics of the Philippines and Indonesia

“…Clients support their patrons politically, and patrons mediate between their clients and the state by obtaining benefits like jobs and licenses. Election ballots are part of the currency of patron-client interactions (Simandjuntak, 2012).…”

“…The patronage system is frequently used by the lower social classes as a temporary fix to address their shared issues. Elites exploit public services to win citizens' votes despite their substandard conditions in order to provide a sense of legitimacy for their position (Simandjuntak, 2012).…”

“…Deasy Simanjuntak highlighted that the adoption of direct elections in Indonesian regions where the bureaucracy serves as the primary employment created patronage democracy, where the state holds the monopoly on jobs and services. Additionally, political leaders have substantial responsibility for implementing laws that distribute the employment and services available to the state (Simandjuntak, 2012).…”

Gender quotas in Indonesia: Re-examining the role of international NGOs

“…And the fact that the winning rate for male candidates in the same year was 9.55 percent or 2.6 times higher than women begs the question as to why women's electability is so poor in Indonesia. Studies have shown that women's electoral performances in Indonesian elections continue to be influenced by an incumbency effect (Shair-Rosenfield 2012; Dettman, Pepinsky, and Pierskalla 2017), parties' nomination, including list position (Hillman 2017;Prihatini 2019aPrihatini , 2019c, and cultural barriers (Simandjuntak 2012;Prihatini 2018aPrihatini , 2019d. As part of efforts to improve women's presence in parliament, gender quotas were advocated by activists, NGOs, and female lawmakers (Siregar 2010).…”

Entitlement programmes for garnering votes? The impact of local elections on targeted social protection in decentralised Indonesia

“…To obtain votes and gain loyalty, candidates often persuade potential voters by giving away cash and other goods (food, clothes or souvenirs) at rallies. Candidates usually maintain the connection with their voters through donation during election time and after winning the election (Simandjuntak, 2012). Generally, the resources for these transfers are off-budget and illegal (Mietzner, 2011), but there are indications that some of these practices might be financed from local budget.…”