Gift-Giving and Friendship: Seneca and Paul in Romans 1–8 on the Logic of God's Χάριϛ and Its Human Response

Abstract

In this article I aim to address two questions that might initially appear independent, but are really connected. One is about twentieth century thought, the other is about Paul. Seneca will act as a mediator between the two.

Grace, the Law and Justification in 4 Ezra and the Pauline Letters: A Dialogue

“… 33. The expectation of ‘returning thanks’ implies some awareness of a previous gift granted. Because of this, I would disagree with Engberg-Pedersen (2008: 24) concerning a minor point in an otherwise strong study: ‘It seems, then, that the reason for God’s wrath is lack of recognition, not of a divine gift, but of the sheer divinity of God, of God’s divine majesty.’ It is God’s generosity in providing the second gift, namely the gift of reconciliation in Jesus Christ, after the first gift met without a grateful response that proves God’s nobility as a giver: ‘It is no proof of a generous mind to give a benefit and lose it; the proof of a generous mind is to lose and still to give’ (Seneca, Ben. 7.32).…”

“… 35. That God should give such a gift with the expectation that the recipients would respond in ways that aligned with what would be understood as a grateful response, rather than with no expectation that the gift would impact their lives in a significant way so as to establish (at last) an ongoing, mutual relationship between them and a just and holy God, is entirely in keeping with the ancient ethic of gift-giving as articulated in Aristotle and Seneca (see deSilva 2000: 104-19, 126-33, 141-51; Engberg-Pedersen 2008, especially 27-28, in regard to God in Paul). …”

“…In his application of this Senecan concept to Paul’s description of God in Rom. 3.21-26, Engberg-Pedersen (2008: 26) gives implicit recognition to the fact that some previous benefit had, in fact, been received without gratitude.…”

“…Aristotle’s statement concerning the human debt to the divine seems to offer a counterpoint to the do ut des mentality that Harrison (2003: 284) elevates as the typical Greco-Roman view, against which he understands Paul to be reacting. Some notice should be given at this point to the study of ‘Gift-Giving and Friendship’ by Troels Engberg-Pedersen (2008), who rightly questions the modern philosophers’ insistence that for a gift to be a gift, it must be an entirely uninterested act on the part of the giver. His own study of Seneca’s De beneficiis leads him to the correct understanding that gift-giving in the ancient world was indeed both motivated ‘by true other-regard (acting for another person for his or her sake)’ as well as by the expectation of some form of return, however the gratitude of the recipient might manifest itself (Engberg-Pedersen 2008: 15-16).…”

“…Some notice should be given at this point to the study of ‘Gift-Giving and Friendship’ by Troels Engberg-Pedersen (2008), who rightly questions the modern philosophers’ insistence that for a gift to be a gift, it must be an entirely uninterested act on the part of the giver. His own study of Seneca’s De beneficiis leads him to the correct understanding that gift-giving in the ancient world was indeed both motivated ‘by true other-regard (acting for another person for his or her sake)’ as well as by the expectation of some form of return, however the gratitude of the recipient might manifest itself (Engberg-Pedersen 2008: 15-16). The idea of God granting the gift of existence is supremely other-centered; God’s expectation that he would receive due honor and gratitude for such a gift, or that the gift would be used for good rather than wicked and self-seeking purposes, was entirely in keeping with the noblest ideals of generosity.…”